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FOREWORD
By Joseph E. Stiglitz
Our country has its share of challenges — poverty, unemployment, inequality. Economic analysis can 
help play a role in understanding and addressing these challenges. 
One of the great problems we face today is mass incarceration, a tragedy which has been powerfully 
documented. With almost 1 in 100 American adults locked away behind bars, our incarceration rate 
is the world’s highest — nine to ten times that of many European countries. This adds up to an 
overwhelming 2.3 million people in prison and jail today — nearly 40 percent of whom are African 
American.1 Yet lawmakers are slow to take action and public outrage is largely absent.
This prodigious rate of incarceration is not only inhumane, it is economic folly. How many people sit 
needlessly in prison when, in a more rational system, they could be contributing to our economy? And, 
once out of prison, how many people face a lifetime of depressed economic prospects? When 1 in 28 
children has a parent in prison, the cycle of poverty and unequal opportunity continues a tragic waste 
of human potential for generations.
Americans spend $260 billion every year on criminal justice. That is more than one-quarter of the 
national deficit.2 A year in prison can cost more than a year at Harvard. This is not a hallmark of a well-
performing economy and society. 
This vast fiscal and social toll was created in the name of protecting lives and property. But what 
do we know about the public safety benefits, the ostensible justification for our prison-centered 
approach to crime? 
Some advocates of this system of mass incarceration seem to contend that while the costs have been 
enormous, so have the benefits, the dramatic drop in crime. They would like to believe that this can be 
attributed in large measure to the explosion in incarceration. After all, when offenders go to prison, it 
would seem they are less likely to commit future crimes. But this instinctive reaction does not comport 
with the scientific evidence. 
This report addresses a critical question: What caused the American crime decline? Was it incarceration? 
Was it policing? Or was it something else? This groundbreaking empirical analysis from the Brennan 
Center shows that, on examination, the easy answers do not explain incarceration’s effect on crime. 
This report presents a rigorous and sophisticated empirical analysis performed on the most recent, 
comprehensive dataset to date. 
The authors conclude that incarceration had relatively little to do with the crime decline. They find that 
the dramatic increases in incarceration have had a limited, diminishing effect on crime. And they have 
quantified those minimal benefits. At today’s high incarceration rates, continuing to incarcerate more 
people has almost no effect on reducing crime. 
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These findings raise questions as to whether the toll — fiscal, economic, and societal — of mass 
incarceration is worthwhile in the face of these negligible crime control benefits. The report also 
demonstrates the value of interdisciplinary thinking. It melds law, economics, science, criminology, 
and public policy analysis to address the challenges facing our country. 
The United States has limited resources. We must foster opportunity and work to bridge inequality, not 
fund policies that destroy human potential today and handicap the next generation. The toll of mass 
incarceration on our social and economic future is unsustainable. 
When high levels of incarceration provide scant public safety benefit, it is pointless to continue using — 
wasting — resources in this way. Instead, the country should shift priorities away from policies proven 
to be ineffective and focus our energies on truly beneficial initiatives that both reduce crime and reduce 
mass incarceration. The evidence presented here tells us that these are compatible goals.
Dr. Stiglitz is a University Professor at Columbia University. He is the former Chairman of the United States 
Council of Economic Advisers and a 2001 recipient of Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
By Inimai Chettiar 
For the past 40 years, the United States has been engaged in a vast, costly social experiment. It has 
incarcerated a higher percentage of its people, and for a longer period, than any other democracy. In fact, 
with 5 percent of the world’s population, the U.S. is home to 25 percent of its prisoners. There are five 
times as many people incarcerated today than there were in 1970.3 And prisoners are disproportionately 
people of color. At current rates, one in three black males can expect to spend time behind bars.4 This 
archipelago of prisons and jails costs more than $80 billion annually — about equivalent to the budget 
of the federal Department of Education.5 This is the phenomenon of mass incarceration. 
Mass incarceration was a distinct response by lawmakers and the public to the social tumult of the 1960s 
and the increasing crime rate of the 1970s and 1980s. The standard theory supporting incarceration as 
the primary crime-control tactic posits that incarceration not only incapacitates past offenders, but also 
deters future ones.6 
Crime across the United States has steadily declined over the last two decades. Today, the crime rate is 
about half of what it was at its height in 1991. Violent crime has fallen by 51 percent since 1991, and 
property crime by 43 percent.7 What was once seen as a plague, especially in urban areas, is now at least 
manageable in most places.8 Rarely has there been such a rapid change in mass behavior.
This observation begs two central questions: Why has crime fallen? And to what degree is incarceration, 
or other criminal justice policy, responsible?
Social scientists and policy experts have searched for answers. Various explanations have been offered: 
expanded police forces, an aging population, employment rates, and even legalized abortion. Most 
likely, there is no one cause for such widespread, dramatic change. Many factors are responsible. 
This report isolates two criminal justice policies — incarceration and one policing approach — and 
provides new findings on their effects on crime reduction using a regression analysis.9 To fully isolate 
the effects of these two policies on crime reduction, this report also examines 12 additional commonly 
cited theories about what caused the crime decline. Effects are also separated out by decade: 1990-
1999 (“the 1990s”) and 2000-2013 (“the 2000s”). This distinction helps expose the nuanced effects of 
variables given the different demographic, economic, and policy trends in each decade.
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This report issues three central findings, which are summarized in Table 1:
1. Increased incarceration at today’s levels has a negligible crime control benefit: Incarceration
has been declining in effectiveness as a crime control tactic since before 1980. Since 2000,
the effect on the crime rate of increasing incarceration, in other words, adding individuals
to the prison population, has been essentially zero. Increased incarceration accounted for
approximately 6 percent of the reduction in property crime in the 1990s (this could vary
statistically from 0 to 12 percent), and accounted for less than 1 percent of the decline in
property crime this century. Increased incarceration has had little effect on the drop in violent
crime in the past 24 years. In fact, large states such as California, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, and Texas have all reduced their prison populations while crime has continued to fall.
2. One policing approach that helps police gather data used to identify crime patterns and
target resources, a technique called CompStat, played a role in bringing down crime in
cities: Based on an analysis of the 50 most populous cities, this report finds that CompStat-style
programs were responsible for a 5 to 15 percent decrease in crime in those cities that introduced
it. Increased numbers of police officers also played a role in reducing crime.
3. Certain social, economic, and environmental factors also played a role in the crime drop:
According to this report’s empirical analysis, the aging population, changes in income, and
decreased alcohol consumption also affected crime. A review of past research indicates that
consumer confidence and inflation also seem to have contributed to crime reduction.
What’s New in This Report?
• New	quantification	of	the	diminishing	effect	of	incarceration	on	crime	reduction,	based	on
more than a decade of new data.
• Specific	quantification	of	the	contribution	of	incarceration	to	the	crime	decline	nationally	and
in all 50 states.
• Analysis	of	14	major	theories	of	crime	reduction,	including	the	effect	of	theories	on	each	other,
providing a more comprehensive look at what caused the crime drop.
• The	first	national	empirical	analysis	of	the	police	management	technique	known	as	CompStat.
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Table 1: Popular Theories on the Crime Decline
Decade Factors Contributing to the Crime Drop Factors that Did Not Seem to Affect Crime Disputed Factors
1990-1999 Aging Population (0-5%)
Consumer Confidence*
Decreased Alcohol Consumption (5-10%)
Decreased Unemployment (0-5%)
Growth in Income (0-7%)
Increased Incarceration (0-10%)
Increased Police Numbers (0-10%)
Inflation*
Enactment of Right-to-Carry Gun Laws (no 
evidence of effect) 
Use of Death Penalty (no evidence of effect)
Decreased 
Crack Use*
Decreased Lead 
in Gasoline*
Legalization 
of Abortion*
2000-2013 Consumer Confidence*
Decreased Alcohol Consumption (5-10%)
Growth in Income (5-10%)
Inflation*
Introduction of CompStat±
Aging Population (no evidence of an effect)
Decreased Crack Use*
Decreased Lead in Gasoline*
Enactment of Right-to-Carry Gun Laws  
(no evidence of effect) 
Increased Incarceration (0-1%)
Increased Police Numbers  
(no evidence of an effect)
Increased Unemployment (0-3%)
Legalization of Abortion*
Use of Death Penalty (no evidence of effect)
Source: Brennan Center analysis.10
* Denotes summaries of past research. All other findings are based on original empirical analysis.
±This report found that the introduction of CompStat-style programs is associated with a 5-15 percent 
decrease in crime in cities where it was implemented. From this finding, it can be concluded that CompStat 
had some effect on the national crime drop in the 2000s.
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Figure 1: Popular Theories on the Crime Decline
 
 Increased Incarceration (0-7%)
 Increased Police Numbers (0-10%)
 Aging Population (0-5%)
 Growth in Income (5-10%)
 Decreased Alcohol Consumption (5-10%)
 Unemployment (0-5%)
 Consumer Confidence, Inflation (some effect)
  Decreased Crack Use, Legalized Abortion, Decreased Lead in 
Gasoline (possibly some effect)
 Other Factors
* Use of Death Penalty, Enactment of Right-to-Carry Laws (no 
evidence of an effect)
Percent of Crime Decline (1990–1999)
 Increased Incarceration (0-1%)
 Growth in Income (5-10%)
 Decreased Alcohol Consumption (5-10%)
 Introduction of CompStat (some effect)
 Consumer Confidence, Inflation (some effect)
 Other Factors
*  Decreased Crack Use, Legalized Abortion, Decreased Lead in 
Gasoline (likely no effect)
*  Use of Death Penalty, Enactment of Right-to-Carry Laws, 
Increased Police Numbers, Aging Population, Unemployment (no 
evidence of an effect)
Percent of Crime Decline (2000–2013)
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Incarceration and Crime
While there has been a paucity of empirical analysis exploring the diminishing returns of incarceration, 
some recent work has discussed the phenomenon. A 2014 report from the Brookings Institution’s 
Hamilton Project explained that incarceration has “diminishing marginal returns.”11 In other words, 
incarceration becomes less effective the more it is used. The Brookings report analyzes trends in two 
regions, Italy and California, to draw this conclusion. Similarly, a 2014 study by the National Academy 
of Sciences, grounded in a review of past research through 2000, noted that “the incremental deterrent 
effect of increases in lengthy prison sentences is modest at best.”12 
With the benefit of a decade more of data, this report seeks to update and quantify the diminishing 
returns of incarceration as highlighted in other reports, and also provide information on theories of the 
crime decline to further show the diminished effect of incarceration. This report finds that incarceration 
in the U.S. has reached a level where it no longer provides a meaningful crime reduction benefit. Table 2 
summarizes the trends in crime and incarceration from 1990 to 2013. Most notably, the trends do not 
show a consistent relationship. Specifically, in the 2000s, crime continued to drop while incarceration 
grew slowly. This evidence indicates a more complicated relationship between the two variables, and that 
increased incarceration is not effective at its current levels.
Table 2: Crime and Incarceration Rates (1990-2013)
1990-2013 1990-1999 
(“1990s”)
2000-2013
(“2000s”)
Violent Crime
(murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, aggravated assault)
50% decline 28% decline 27% decline
Property Crime
(burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft)
46% decline 26% decline 25% decline
Imprisonment 61% increase 61% increase 1% increase
Sources: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports; U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau 
of Justice Statistics.13
As more low-level offenders flood prisons, each additional individual’s incarceration has, on average, a 
consecutively smaller crime reduction effect. The incarceration rate jumped by more than 60 percent 
from 1990 to 1999, while the rate of violent crime dropped by 28 percent. In the next decade, the rate 
of incarceration increased by just 1 percent, while the violent crime rate fell by 27 percent. To be clear, 
this report does not find that incarceration never affects crime. Incarceration can control crime in many 
circumstances. But the current exorbitant level of incarceration has reached a point where diminishing 
returns have rendered the crime reduction effect of incarceration so small, it has become nil. 
To isolate the effect of incarceration on crime, the authors considered the effects of 12 other leading 
theories of crime reduction, as noted in Table 3. These theories were chosen because of their frequency 
in media and research studies. The authors attempted to secure state-by-state data from 1980 to 2013 in 
all states for each theory and ran the data through a multi-variable regression that controls for the effects 
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of each variable on crime, and each variable on other variables. The findings are consistent with the 
most respected studies on these theories. The authors could not secure state-by-state national data for 
every year 1980 to 2013 for five variables: inflation, consumer confidence, waning crack use, decrease 
of lead in gasoline, and legalization of abortion. Data for these variables were not collected at the state 
level for all the years needed and therefore could not be incorporated into the state-level regression. In 
those instances, the authors analyzed past research and provided a summary. 
Part I of this report presents this state-level analysis, which is summarized in Table 3, noting which 
findings are based in this report’s original analysis and which findings are a summary of past research. 
Notably, these numbers are estimates, as any regression analysis of a large data set with many variables 
will not yield one definitive answer. There is always some uncertainty and statistical error involved in 
any empirical analysis. However, these findings are obtained through statistically valid and economically 
sound, peer-reviewed procedures to produce best estimates.
Table 3: State-Level Analysis on the Crime Decline (1990-2013)
 
Theory
Percentage Factor in 
Crime Decline
1990-2013
Percentage Factor in 
Crime Decline
1990-1999 (“1990s”)
Percentage Factor in 
Crime Decline
2000-2013 (“2000s”)
Criminal Justice 
Policies
1. Increased 
Incarceration
Violent: no effect
Property: 0-7%
Violent: no effect
Property: 0-12%
Violent: no effect
Property: 0-1%†
2. Use of Death Penalty No evidence of an 
effect
No evidence of an 
effect
No evidence of an 
effect
3. Increased Police 
Numbers
0-5% 0-10% No evidence of an 
effect†
4. Enactment of Right-
to-Carry Gun Laws
No evidence of an 
effect
No evidence of an 
effect
No evidence of an 
effect
Economic Factors 5. Unemployment 0-3% 0-5% No evidence of an 
effect
6. Growth in Income 5-10% 5-10% 5-10%
7. Inflation* Some effect on 
property crime
Some effect on 
property crime
Some effect on 
property crime
8. Consumer 
Confidence*
Some effect on 
property crime
Some effect on 
property crime
Some effect on 
property crime
Environmental and 
Social Factors
9. Decreased Alcohol 
Consumption
5-10% 5-10% 5-10%
10. Aging Population 0-5% 0-5% No evidence of an 
effect†
11. Decreased Crack 
Use*
Possibly some effect Possibly some effect on 
violent crime
Negligible
12. Legalized Abortion* Possibly some effect Possibly some effect Negligible
13. Decreased Lead in 
Gasoline*
Possibly some effect Possibly some effect on 
violent crime 
Negligible
Source: Brennan Center analysis.14
* Denotes summaries of past research. All other findings are based on original empirical analysis.
† Indicated this variable did not increase or decrease significantly during the period to have an impact on crime.
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How Does Policing Relate To Incarceration?
Police often serve as the first contact between individuals and the criminal justice system. Police play 
an important role in both crime control and the size of the correctional population. The police usually 
make the first determination of whether someone will enter the criminal justice system. Arrests and 
other police contact can lead to booking, pre-trial detention, prosecution, and imprisonment. 
Crime and Policing 
Policing is one of the significant criminal justice policies that can affect both crime and incarceration 
rates. This report seeks to fill a gap in research on the effect of policing on crime. While there has been 
some empirical analysis on increased numbers of police officers and crime reduction, fewer national-
level analyses have been conducted on the effectiveness of how police fight crime. To provide a glimpse 
into the link between policing and the crime drop, this report undertakes the first national study of the 
crime-reducing effect of the police management technique known as CompStat. 
It is difficult to measure how different police departments deploy tactics, such as “broken windows 
policing” (where police focus on low-level crimes such as breaking windows and graffiti on the theory 
that such enforcement will stop more serious crime), “hot spots policing” (where police focus resources 
in areas where crime is most likely to occur), or “stop-and-frisk” (when officers stop individuals, who 
may not be overtly engaged in criminal activity, and conduct a pat-down).15 It is difficult to study cause 
and effect of these tactics on a national level because each city and department defines and applies these 
tactics differently.
Through the authors’ research, CompStat emerged as one of the most consistent, easily identifiable, 
and widespread policing techniques employed during the time period under examination. CompStat 
is a police management technique — a way to run police departments — that was widely deployed in 
the nation’s cities in the 1990s and 2000s, starting in 1994 under New York City Police Department 
Commissioner Bill Bratton. Although departments use it differently, the general objective is the same: 
to implement strong management and accountability within police departments to execute strategies 
based on robust data collection to reduce and prevent crime. Departments and units deploy different 
specific tactics, including the ones listed above, to manage crime in neighborhoods. Notably, CompStat 
should not be conflated with these tactics. CompStat is not equivalent to broken windows, hot spots, 
or stop-and-frisk. 
For the purposes of this report, CompStat comprises a 14th theory about the decline in crime. It serves 
as one widespread way in which police manage crime in cities across the country. Because policing is 
a local function, executed on the city and county level, an empirical analysis of CompStat must be 
conducted at a local level instead of a state level. Part II of this report presents a city-level analysis of 
CompStat and also explains the nuances of CompStat in further detail.
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Table 4: CompStat’s Effect on Crime in 50 Most Populous Cities (1994-2012)
Theory Percentage Change in Crime (1994-2012)
Criminal Justice Policy 14. Introduction of CompStat 5-15% decline in violent and property crime 
Source: Brennan Center analysis.16
Note: The city-level analysis relies on monthly data. Monthly city-level crime data were unavailable for 
2013 at time of publication of this report and therefore could not be included.
Table 4 shows that CompStat-style programs were responsible for an estimated 5 to 15 percent decrease 
in crime in cities where it was introduced. Because CompStat is implemented differently in each city, it 
may have been responsible for more of the crime decline in some cities and less of the crime decline in 
others. In New York, for example, the introduction of CompStat signified a large shift in departmental 
priorities and tactics and therefore could have had a different effect on crime than the national average.17 
Other Factors in Crime Reduction
This report finds that increased incarceration had some effect on reducing crime since 1990 — however, 
far lower than previously thought and becoming almost zero in the 2000s. Other factors that played a role 
in the crime decline were increased numbers of police officers, deploying data-driven policing techniques 
such as CompStat, changes in income, decreased alcohol consumption, and an aging population. A review 
of past research indicated that consumer confidence and inflation also played a role. 
Two other controversial theories — the legalization of abortion and decreasing lead exposure — are 
among the most frequently cited. The authors of this report were not able to secure annual, state-by 
state data on these two factors for the complete time span from 1980 to 2013. (Please see Appendix 
B for a further explanation.) Based on an extensive review of past research, this report concludes these 
factors could have possibly affected the crime rate in the 1990s. Any effect, if there was one, likely 
diminished greatly by the 2000s because those variables played less of a role in that decade. 
***
This report aims to spur discussion of what constitutes effective policies to deter crime. It aims to use 
science, law, and logic to break the myth that has fueled mass incarceration and resulted in harm to 
our communities, our economy, and our country. More incarceration does not lead to less crime. The 
United States can simultaneously reduce crime and reduce mass incarceration. 
Chettiar is the director of the Justice Program at the Brennan Center.
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EXPERT REVIEWERS
Drafts of this report underwent a rigorous review process with the input of interdisciplinary experts. 
The authors submitted drafts to experts in economics, law, criminology, and policing. These experts 
provided significant feedback on the report’s findings, text, and methodology. The authors then 
modified and refined the report based on these comments. The findings of this report should not be 
ascribed to these reviewers, as they served as experts in their respective fields helping to inform this 
report’s interdisciplinary nature. 
Expert reviewers included:*
• 	Hon. Richard Posner, Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior
Lecturer, University of Chicago School of Law.
• 	Daniel Rubinfeld, Professor of Law and Professor of Economics, University of California, Berkeley; 
Visiting Professor, New York University School of Law.
• 	Richard Rosenfeld, Professor of Criminology, University of Missouri St. Louis; Chair, National
Academy of Sciences Roundtable on Understanding Crime Trends.
• 	Jim Bueermann, President, Police Foundation.
• 	Darrel Stephens, Executive Director, Major Cities Chiefs Association.
• 	John Firman, Research Director, International Association of Chiefs of Police.
• 	William Andrews, Deputy Commissioner, Management Analysis & Planning, New York City
Police Department.
• 	Preeti Chauhan, Assistant Professor of Psychology, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, City
University of New York.
• 	Maurice Classen, Program Officer, Community & Economic Development, John D. and
Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; former Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Seattle, Wash.
*Organizational affiliations are included for identification purposes only.
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SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY 
This report undertakes a comprehensive study of the drop in the crime rate from 1990 to 2013, paying 
close attention to the role of incarceration and one aspect of policing. 
Before and during their research, the authors conducted a thorough review and analysis of past 
academic, scholarly, and policy research on the topic. The authors also completed more than 75 formal 
and informal interviews with legal, economic, and criminology experts and practitioners including: 
•	 criminal	law	professors,	criminal	justice	experts,	and	state	criminal	justice	organization	leaders;
•	 economists	who	research	crime	or	incarceration	or	have	econometric	expertise;
•	 criminologists	and	sociologists	who	research	incarceration	or	crime	trends;
•	 members	of	the	National	Academy	of	Sciences	Roundtable	on	Understanding	Crime	Trends;	
•	 police	and	law	enforcement	experts	and	officers;	and
•	 other	experts	who	have	researched	the	crime	decline	and	incarceration.18
The report examines 14 popular theories for the crime decline over the last 20 years. 
Part I 
The authors’ primary focus in Part I is an analysis of incarceration’s effect on crime. In order to 
accurately isolate the effect of increased incarceration, the authors searched for potential confounding 
variables that could also affect crime. The authors identified 12 additional possible theories and 
attempted to control for their effect. These theories were chosen because they were the most 
commonly cited and explored theories in the media and in academic, economic, legal, and policy 
research on the crime drop. 
The authors searched for annual data on these theories for all 50 states from 1980 to 2013. The authors 
used data beginning in 1980 (to capture the major changes in crime and incarceration rates in the 
following decades) and ending in 2013 (the year of most recent data). For the following eight theories, 
the authors were able to secure data in this form: 
•	 increased	incarceration;
•	 increased	police	numbers;
•	 use	of	death	penalty;
•	 enactment	of	right-to-carry	gun	laws;
•	 unemployment;
•	 growth	in	income;	
•	 decreased	alcohol	consumption;19 and
•	 an	aging	population.
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Data for these theories were most commonly available at the state level. Authors analyzed these variables 
using a large dataset for all 50 states and the District of Columbia. The state-level dataset contained 
over 1,600 yearly data-point observations over 34 years (1980 to 2013). In total, the dataset consisted 
of over 115,000 data entries. This report uses the most recently available data, which is 13 years of 
data beyond what other empirical analyses on this subject have examined. The data sources used to 
inform each variable were critical decisions, informed by criminal law, criminological, public policy, 
and economic principles and research. The inter-disciplinary team that produced this report was able to 
bring together expertise from different backgrounds to produce a well-rounded analysis.
The authors then conducted a multi-variable economic regression analysis on data for these variables 
from 1980 to 2013. The authors’ regression analysis controls for the effects of each variable on all 
other variables, and also controls for demographic variables including age and race. (A regression is 
a set of mathematical tools for estimating the relationships between or among variables.) The model 
also accounts for the diminishing returns of incarceration. Such a large dataset allowed the authors to 
observe aggregate correlations to obtain more reliable estimates of the effects of each variable on crime. 
The dataset also exhibited substantial variation, both over time and across states, allowing the authors 
to better identify and isolate the relationship between each variable and its effect on crime. The authors 
examined the effects of these variables on the crime drop as a whole, as well as on violent crime and 
property crime specifically. They also separated out effects by decade: 1990-1999 (“the 1990s”) and 
2000-2013 (“the 2000s”) to expose more nuanced effects given the different demographic, economic, 
and policy trends in each decade.
The authors used reported crimes as a proxy for all crime. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR) is currently the most comprehensive source of crime data. Though the UCR does 
not include unreported crimes (of which there are many) and there remain problems and deficiencies 
with the UCR, it is the current standard source of national crime data. It is also the data on which the 
documented “crime drop” is based.20 
To study the incarceration variable the authors first sought to include the total incarceration rate, 
including federal prisons, state prisons, and local jails. As explained further in Appendix B, federal 
prison data and local jail data were not available for all the years analyzed and for all states. For that 
reason, the authors used state imprisonment data (the number of state prisoners incarcerated in public 
or private prisons, and the number of state prisoners held in local jails). It does not include individuals 
in the overall jail population (those held pretrial or serving short sentences), juvenile facilities, or 
immigration detention centers. The use of this subset of incarceration is in line with other research in 
the field. The exclusion of federal prisoners, juvenile detainees, and the majority of the jail population 
does not affect the core findings of this report. If that data were included, the rate of incarceration 
would be even higher than that in the authors’ regression. A higher incarceration rate would likely show 
more dramatic diminishing returns on crime reduction. Accordingly, this report’s empirical findings 
are likely conservative compared to what a more inclusive definition of “incarceration” would produce. 
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For the following five theories, yearly data were not available state-by-state for all the years analyzed 
and therefore could not be included in the regression. The authors therefore undertook a sophisticated 
analysis of past research for these variables:
•	 inflation;
•	 consumer	confidence;
•	 decreased	crack	use;
•	 legalized	abortion;	and
•	 decreased	lead	in	gasoline.
Specifically, state-by-state data could not be secured on the incidence of recorded abortions for 16 
years in the year range sought. Data on the amount of lead in gasoline are not collected at the state 
level by the Environmental Protection Agency. Data on crack cocaine use are available intermittently 
through surveys, but not in the necessary annual state-level format. These data were requested from 
other researchers who had studied these theories but could not be obtained.
Of course, there are many other variables that could have affected crime. It is impossible to include all 
possible theoretical contributors to the crime drop, as the variables could be infinite. Some factors such 
as technology, sentence lengths, other forms of policing and criminal justice policies, or other social 
factors could also have contributed to the crime drop. These are areas ripe for further research. 
Part II
Given the prevalence of discussions about the effect of policing on crime in media and policy discussions, 
the authors searched for a method to measure the effect of policing on crime. Because policing occurs at 
a local level, at the city or precinct level, the authors could not combine their analysis of policing into 
the state-level analysis. They therefore conducted a separate city-level analysis, which is presented in 
Part II. As explained in the Executive Summary, the authors chose to examine the police management 
technique CompStat, as it is a widely used technique.
The city-level panel dataset examined the introduction of CompStat in the 50 most populous U.S. 
cities. It also analyzed numbers of police in these cities over this same period to attempt to isolate the 
effect of CompStat on crime. The city-level dataset contained more than 13,000 monthly observations 
during 23 years (1990-2012) for variables pertaining to crime and police. Monthly city-level crime data 
for 2013 was not available at time of publication. CompStat was first introduced in the U.S. in 1994, 
in New York City, and therefore the authors used data slightly before that date to observe the results. In 
total, this dataset contained more than 198,000 data entries. 
The authors determined when and whether a city employed CompStat through police departments’ 
self-reported use through their own research. This research was then vetted by expert police leaders who 
reviewed this report and confirmed by phone calls to each police department.
For a more detailed explanation of the methodology, data sources, and results tables see Appendix B.
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STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CRIME
Part I presents the authors’ state-level data and analysis and a synopsis of past research. To fully isolate 
the effects of incarceration and understand the role of incarceration in relation to other theories, the 
authors controlled for and researched the role of 12 additional variables. These variables, each discussed 
in turn below, can be broadly categorized into criminal justice policies, economic factors, and social 
and environmental factors. 
Part I first examines the role of incarceration. It then provides brief summaries of the findings on 
additional variables. Where original data were not available for a variable, it is so noted and a summary 
of past research is presented in lieu of original analysis. 
A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES
1. Increased Incarceration
Incarceration & Crime: Based on original empirical analysis, this report finds that increased 
incarceration at today’s levels has a negligible crime control benefit. Incarceration has been declining 
in effectiveness as a crime control tactic since before 1980. Since 2000, the effect of increasing 
incarceration on the crime rate has been essentially zero. Increased incarceration accounted for 
approximately 6 percent of the reduction in property crime in the 1990s (this could vary statistically 
from 0 to 12 percent), and accounted for less than 1 percent of the decline in property crime this 
century. Increased incarceration has had no effect on the drop in violent crime in the past 24 years. 
In fact, large states such as California, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Texas have all reduced 
their prison populations while crime has continued to fall.
Since the 1970s, incarceration in the U.S. has increased steadily and dramatically.21 Criminal justice 
policies enacted during the height of the War on Drugs in the 1980s and 1990s expanded the use of 
incarceration as a response to rising crime and fear of crime. These include mandatory minimums, 
truth-in-sentencing, “three strikes you’re out” laws, federal funding for prison construction, and other 
sentencing regimes that expanded the prison population. 
As explained in the Methodology, federal prison data and local jail data were not available for all the 
years analyzed and for all 50 states. For that reason, this report focuses on state imprisonment data 
(the number of state prisoners — either incarcerated in prisons or held in local jails) as a proxy for the 
full incarceration rate. The use of the state imprisonment subset as a proxy for total incarceration is in 
accordance with other empirical research in this area, including the national studies described below. 
I.
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Figure 2: Incarceration and Crime Rates (1980-2013)
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Justice Statics.22 
Figure 2 illustrates the total number of state prisoners, alongside the occurrence of violent and property 
crime. While violent and property crime peaked in about 1991, the imprisonment rate continued to 
grow. Over roughly the past 20 years there has been a negative correlation between imprisonment and 
crime: as crime dropped, incarceration continued to increase.
A simple correlation does not, however, imply causation. These trends do not mean that increased 
incarceration caused the drop in crime. After all, in the 20 years previous, the correlation was the 
opposite: from about 1970 to 1990, incarceration and crime increased simultaneously. It is not possible 
to draw reliable conclusions by simply observing trends between these two variables. 
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What’s New about this Report’s Analysis on Incarceration and Crime
The authors find a significantly lower effect of increased incarceration on crime at today’s levels 
than much of the research that has come before. Why? These three aspects of this report’s analysis 
uncover incarceration’s lower effect on crime:
Includes More Than a Decade of Recent Data Than Most National Empirical Analyses: This report 
uses the most recently available data, which is 13 years of data beyond what most studies in the 
field have examined, as shown in Table 5. Because the incarceration rate has risen to such an 
unprecedented level, analyses run on 1990s data may be less informative without the additional 
insights provided by data from the 2000s. 
Accounts for the Effect of Diminishing Returns: When the incarceration rate rises to high levels, 
additional incarceration will be less effective as a crime-reduction tool. Each additional prisoner 
will yield less crime reduction. As explained in a 2014 Brookings Institution report: “The crime-
reduction gains from higher incarceration rates depend critically on the incarceration rate itself. 
When the incarceration rate is low, marginal gains from increasing the incarceration rate are higher. 
This follows from the fact that when prisons are used sparingly, incarceration is reserved for those 
who commit the most serious crimes. By contrast, when the incarceration rate is high, the marginal 
crime-reduction gains from further increases tend to be lower, because the offender on the margin 
between incarceration and an alternative sanction tends to be less serious. In other words, the crime-
fighting benefits of incarceration diminish with the scale of the prison population.”23 These benefits 
diminish because when incarceration levels are higher, individuals who pose relatively little threat 
to society are more likely to be incarcerated. This effect makes each additional person incarcerated 
offer fewer crime control benefits. Earlier studies did not use empirical models that accounted for 
the diminishing returns of incarceration on crime reduction. One exception is the 2006 study by 
economist Anne Piehl and sociologists Raymond Liedka and Bert Useem.24 This report builds 
upon and augments that study’s regression model; it also has the benefit of more than 10 years of 
new data than that study. 
Controls for Effects of Other Variables: The authors gathered data on a wide array of factors discussed by 
the media or researchers as possibly affecting crime. These include: increased incarceration; increased 
police numbers; use of death penalty; enactment of right-to-carry gun laws; unemployment; growth 
in income; decreased alcohol consumption; and the aging population. These variables were included 
in the authors’ regression model. Controlling for the effects of these potentially confounding variables 
allows the authors to further isolate the effect of incarceration on crime.
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a. Past Research
Highlights of past research on the contribution of incarceration levels to crime are provided below. 
The authors undertook an extensive review of past research, but not all studies are presented below. 
Generally, there are three categories of research on incarceration and crime: reports that discuss the 
“diminishing returns” of incarceration on crime, but do not perform empirical analysis to quantify it; 
empirical analyses that do not account for diminishing returns; and empirical analyses that do take into 
account diminishing returns.
A full understanding of the effect of incarceration on crime requires a better understanding of the 
role of diminishing returns: How does an ever-increasing prison population change how incarceration 
affects crime over time?
One category of studies on this topic is those that note incarceration could have diminishing returns 
on crime reduction. In a 2004 paper, economist Steven Levitt examined 10 variables that could have 
contributed to the crime drop. Levitt found incarceration to be a main driver of the 1990s crime drop, 
but he specifically acknowledged that his analysis did not fully account for the diminishing returns of 
incarceration.26 He also noted the potential for “sharply declining marginal benefits” of incarceration 
on crime, which, if present, could have affected his own findings.27 
That same year, criminologists James Austin and Tony Fabelo articulated the fiscal implications of 
incarceration’s diminishing returns: with growing corrections budgets and a state budget crisis, states 
increasingly wanted to know whether each new dollar they applied to incarceration was put to good 
use in reducing crime.28 In 2005, the Sentencing Project acknowledged diminishing returns as a top 
concern, though without an empirical analysis: “While incarceration is one factor affecting crime rates, 
its impact is more modest than many proponents suggest, and is increasingly subject to diminishing 
returns.”29 Similarly, in a 2009 Brookings study, economist John Donohue theorized that “social 
spending” (spending on preschool education, for example) could generate similar crime reduction at 
a lower social cost than incarceration, and noted the diminishing returns of incarceration on crime.30 
In April 2014, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a lengthy report on incarceration. That 
study reviewed past research and concluded that the majority of studies found incarceration probably 
did reduce crime from the 1970s through 2000, but its effect is “unlikely to have been large.”31 This past 
body of research generally did not analyze data after 2000 and did not account for diminishing returns. 
Many of the major studies examined by NAS are included in Table 5.
Researchers examining incarceration and crime in specific regions have also expressed a concern about 
diminishing returns. A 2013 study from the Washington State Institute for Public Policy cautioned that 
incarceration rates and police per capita are both susceptible to diminishing returns as to their effect on 
crime reduction.32 Most recently, in May 2014, the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton Project published 
a report by public policy professors Steven Raphael and Michael Stoll comparing the recent experiences 
of Italy and California. They found that in California, which has a much higher incarceration rate than 
Italy, a recent release of prisoners resulted in very little change in crime. However, a similar prisoner 
release in Italy, which has a much lower incarceration rate, caused a noticeable increase in crime. 
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What are diminishing returns and why are they important?
To understand the concept and importance of diminishing returns, consider the example of a 
hypothetical factory. Basic economics textbooks present this factory hypothetical to illustrate this 
concept.25 
Hypothetical Factory: Workers and Output 
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per worker with added workers.
Nonlinear estimate accounting 
for diminishing returns.
At first, as demonstrated by Figure A, the more workers the factory adds, the higher its production. 
A simple linear analysis accurately reveals this relationship. However, if the factory adds even more 
workers, production may not increase in the same way. This could occur because the factory could 
become too crowded, workers may get in each other’s way, it may be harder for supervisors to manage 
so many workers, or there may not be enough machines for each worker to use. As shown in Figure 
B, a simple linear analysis cannot capture this relationship. A linear relationship may show no 
productivity increase, or even a slight productivity decrease. 
Only a nonlinear relationship, as exhibited in Figure C, can capture the diminishing returns of 
adding additional workers. The productivity of each additional hired worker can vary depending on 
how many workers were hired before him or her. 
The same is true for incarceration. Effectiveness depends on prevalence. Incarceration’s prevalence has 
reached an unprecedented level, so any empirical analysis must account for that. As demonstrated by 
basic figures, diminishing returns become more clearly visible through collection of data over more 
time. Older data will show a stronger effect of incarceration on crime (as in Figure A), but with newer 
data and the ability to document a nonlinear relationship, diminishing returns will be exposed (as in 
Figure C). With more than 10 years of new data and a model accounting for diminishing returns, this 
report’s model reveals updated findings compared to past research.
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This is evidence consistent with diminishing returns: when the incarceration rate is lower, there is 
more of an effect on crime; and similarly when the incarceration rate is higher, there is less of an effect 
on crime. Raphael and Stoll extrapolated from these examples that diminishing returns are present in 
incarceration generally and especially at high rates such as those present in the U.S.33 
A second category of studies on the subject performed empirical analysis but did not account for 
diminishing returns of incarceration. This categorizes most of the research to date on the topic. 
An early empirical study on the topic comes from sociologist and lawyer Thomas Marvell and economist 
Carlisle Moody in 1994. Marvel and Moody’s estimate of incarceration’s effectiveness on crime was 
based on data through 1989. During the 1980s, incarceration had a higher marginal effect on the crime 
drop because it was less prevalent. The incarceration rate in 1983 was 1 in 364, whereas in 2012 it was 
1 in 108 — a 237 percent increase.34 Applying their estimate to data from the 1990s would indicate 
that slightly over 30 percent of the crime drop in the 1990s was due to incarceration.35 In a similar 2002 
study, which used data through 1998, economist Robert DeFina and sociologist Thomas Arvanites 
found that incarceration explained 21 percent of the drop in property crime in the 1990s and had no 
effect on violent crime.36
Levitt’s 2004 study found incarceration accounted for 58 percent of the violent crime drop and 41 
percent of property crime drop.37 As noted, he specifically acknowledged that his analysis may not have 
fully accounted for the diminishing returns of incarceration. 
In 2006, sociologist Bruce Western examined how incarceration influenced crime through rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, and deterrence. Using data through 2000, Western estimated that about 10 percent of the 
1990s crime drop could be attributed to increased incarceration.38 To isolate the effects of incarceration, 
he controlled for other variables, including: spending on police, various indicators of unemployment, 
income inequality, racial demographics, sentencing guidelines and practices, and political parties in 
power. Western also made adjustments for the effect of prison on crime, which includes how prison can 
actually increase crime (i.e. upon release from prison, research shows, many individuals become more 
likely to commit more crime).39 (This effect is often referred to as the “criminogenic” effect of prison. 
The phenomenon of two variables that simultaneously affect one another is called a “simultaneity 
effect” in economic analysis. This effect is explained further in Appendix B.)
In a 2008 study, criminologist Eric Baumer found that increased incarceration accounted for 10 to 
35 percent of the 1990s crime decline.40 He relied on data through 2004. Baumer found that the 
consistent number of people incarcerated in state prison (what he calls prisoner “stock”) had a crime 
reducing effect. However, he found that the number of people entering and exiting prison (i.e. prisoner 
“flow”) had a much smaller and more complex effect on reducing crime. Baumer’s results are not 
represented in Table 5 because he considered incarceration’s effect on specific crimes, such as homicide 
and burglary, and therefore his findings cannot be generalized to apply to the effect of incarceration on 
violent or property crimes generally. 
Some of the largest estimated effects of incarceration on crime came from public policy expert William 
Spelman. Spelman’s 2005 study used data from counties in Texas, from 1990 through 2000. His 
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findings imply that 85 percent of the drop in property crime in the 1990s and 53 percent of the drop 
in violent crime in Texas were due to incarceration. Notably, Spelman’s model did not account for the 
diminishing returns of incarceration. Texas increased its incarceration rate more dramatically than the 
rest of the country. This dramatic increase further subjects Texas to the effects of diminishing returns. 
The study also did not have the benefit of additional data through 2013, which would further show any 
effects of diminishing returns in a model that accounts for them. Therefore Spelman’s findings are likely 
much higher than they would be if diminishing returns were accounted for. Spelman himself notes that 
his findings are not applicable nationally.41 Other empiricists studying crime have agreed.42
Additional research comes from studies that analyzed the effect of other variables on crime but measured 
the effects of incarceration in the process. In 1999, economist Zsolt Becsi, focusing on the effects of 
economic and demographic conditions and using data through 1994, estimated that incarceration 
led to 10 percent of the drop in violent crime and about 18 percent of the drop in property crime in 
the 1990s.43 A 2001 report by Raphael and economist Rudolf Winter-Ebmer focused on the effect of 
unemployment on crime. Analyzing data through 1997, they found incarceration to be responsible for 
4 percent of the violent crime drop and 27 percent of the property crime drop in the 1990s.44 
Because these studies did not explicitly account for the effect of diminishing returns of incarceration on 
crime, they may drastically overestimate the effectiveness of incarceration.
A third category of studies are those performing empirical analysis accounting for diminishing returns. 
The authors are aware of only one published national empirical analysis explicitly accounting for the 
diminishing effects of incarceration: the groundbreaking 2006 study by Liedka, Piehl, and Useem.45 
That study, which analyzed data through 2000, quantified the diminishing effects of incarceration on 
crime. It found that increased incarceration might even have the effect of increasing crime if the level 
of incarceration were high enough. The study’s regression included the following additional variables: 
age, unemployment, percent of the population that was black, percent of the population living in 
urban areas, and mean wage for men with a high-school education or less. Both the recent NAS and 
Brookings reports cite this study to draw their conclusion on the effect of incarceration on crime.46
There are a handful of studies analyzing diminishing returns in specific regions. For example, a 2013 
study by Raphael and political scientist Magnus Lofstrom examined diminishing returns of incarceration 
specifically in California.47 In 2011, the state reduced its prison population by 9 percent with the enactment 
of the Public Safety Realignment Act (“Realignment Act”) after a Supreme Court case ordered the state 
to reduce its unconstitutionally overcrowded prisons.48 Lofstrom and Raphael found that California’s pre-
2011 incarceration rates exhibited diminishing returns: as incarceration rates increased, fewer property 
crimes were prevented per offender.49 Their results suggest that in cases of high incarceration rates, such as 
California and nationally, small increases in incarceration lead to little crime reduction. 
But diminishing returns are not only found where incarceration levels are extremely high. Lofstrom 
and Raphael cited European political scientist Ben Vollaard’s 2013 research in the Netherlands, which 
found diminishing returns even at the country’s lower levels of incarceration.50 Studying a policy that 
imposes longer sentences for repeat offenders, Vollaard found, “The size of the crime-reducing effect is 
found to be subject to sharply diminishing returns.”
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Table 5: National Studies on Increased Incarceration’s Impact on Crime  
Study
Based 
on Data 
Through
Accounts for 
Diminishing 
Returns?
1990s 
Violent 
Crime
1990s 
Property 
Crime
2000s 
Violent 
Crime
2000s 
Property 
Crime
Marvell and Moody (1994) 1989 No 31% 33% 2% 2%
Becsi (1999) 1994 No 10% 18% 1% 1%
Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 
(2001)
1997 No 4% 27% 0% 2%
DeFina and Arvanites (2002) 1998 No 0% 21% 0% 1%
Levitt (2004) 1993 No 58% 41% 4% 2%
Western (2006) 2000 No 10% 10% 1% 1%
Liedka, Piehl, and Useem 
(2006)* 
2000 Yes -3% -3% -1% -1%
Brennan Center (2015) 2013 Yes 0% 6% 0% 0.2%
* Negative numbers indicate a finding of an increase in crime.
Table 5 summarizes past findings of national empirical studies on incarceration’s effect on crime 
along with the Brennan Center findings. Each study used data through the listed year to estimate the 
“elasticity” of crime with respect to incarceration (i.e. the percentage crime changes when incarceration 
changes by one percent). Simply put, the elasticity measures how incarceration affects crime. The 
authors applied previous studies’ elasticity estimates to updated crime and incarceration data through 
2013 to impute incarceration’s effect on the drop in crime in the 1990s and the 2000s. These estimates 
are useful to compare findings across studies. (See Appendix B for detailed information on how these 
estimates were calculated.)
b. New Economic Analysis: Diminishing Returns of Incarceration Revealed
This report’s model specifically builds on and augments the model of Liedka and coauthors to account 
for diminishing returns. The authors apply this updated regression model to 13 years of additional data 
(from 2001 to 2013). It also controls for the effects of eight variables (presented in the next section) 
to isolate the effect of incarceration on crime. Updated data, even in a similar model, can produce 
different findings. For these reasons, this report finds a different result than previous studies. (See also 
“What’s New about this Report’s Analysis on Incarceration and Crime?”)
New National Findings
This report finds that increased incarceration had no statistically significant effect on reducing 
violent crime and had a small effect on reducing property crime in the 1990s and the 2000s. Crime’s 
responsiveness to incarceration has decreased dramatically over time. Put simply, this report finds that, 
at current levels, incarceration is no longer as effective a crime-reducing tool as it once was. More 
incarceration does not always lead to less crime.
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Figure 3 graphs the effectiveness of increased incarceration from 1980 to 2013. The dashed lines 
represent the upper and lower bounds of the estimate. (This is also known as the “confidence interval,” 
i.e., the authors are confident, statistically speaking, that the true value lies between the dashed lines.)
The effectiveness of incarceration on reducing crime is defined as the predicted decrease in crime 
resulting from a 1 percent increase in state imprisonment.
This report’s analysis reveals that incarceration has been decreasing as a crime fighting tactic since at 
least 1980. Since approximately 1990, the effectiveness of increased incarceration on bringing down 
crime has been essentially zero.
Figure 3: Effect of Increased Incarceration on Crime (1980-2013)
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Source: Brennan Center analysis.51 
As shown in Figure 4, increased incarceration accounted for approximately 6 percent of the reduction 
in property crime in the 1990s; this could statistically vary from 0 to 12 percent. Increased incarceration 
accounted for less than one one-hundredth of the decline of property crime in the 2000s. Increased 
incarceration had no observable effect on the violent crime decline in the 1990s or in the 2000s.
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Figure 4: The Role of Increased Incarceration in the Crime Decline
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Figure 5 illustrates the effectiveness of increased incarceration on decreasing the rates of specific crimes 
reported in the UCR between 1980 and 2013. Generally, incarceration appears to have played a very 
minor role in the drop in property crimes and no role in the drop in violent crimes. For instance, the 
line at the bottom of the Figure 5 shows that the changing incarceration rates had almost no effect on 
the homicide rate. 
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Figure 5: Effect of Increased Incarceration on Specific Crimes (1980-2013)
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Why did incarceration’s effectiveness at reducing crime decrease during the past 
two decades? 
It may seem counterintuitive that increased incarceration did not do much to reduce crime. Why 
might that be?
Overuse of incarceration leads to ineffectiveness: Much of the increase in incarceration was driven 
by the imprisonment of nonviolent and drug offenders.54 Today, half of state prisoners are serving 
time for nonviolent crimes.55 Almost half of federal prisoners are serving time for drug crimes. 
Further, two-thirds of jail inmates are merely awaiting trial.56 Political scientist Jose Canela-Cocho 
argues that incarceration’s incapacitation effect decreases when incarceration is increasingly used for 
less serious offenders.57 This means incarcerating the two millionth person likely results in much 
less crime reduction effect than locking up the first. Why? As noted above, when prisons are used 
sparingly, incarceration is reserved for the highest-risk and most-serious offenders. Today, the U.S., 
where the incarceration rate is at a historic high, experiences smaller additional (i.e. marginal) 
crime-reduction gains from further increases in incarceration, as the individuals incarcerated, on 
average, tend to have committed less serious crimes.
Prison can cause prisoners to commit more crimes upon release: Criminologists often call prison 
“criminogenic,” meaning that it can increase the criminal behavior of prisoners upon release.58 This 
effect is particularly powerful on low-level offenders.59 Once an individual enters prison, they are 
surrounded by other prisoners who have often committed more serious and violent offenses.60 Upon 
release, they often have trouble finding employment and reintegrating into society due to both legal 
barriers and social stigma.61 Several studies demonstrate the criminogenic effect of prison. A 2002 
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study indicates that using prison sentences instead of probation for low-level drug offenders may 
increase their likelihood of committing crimes upon release.62 Additional research from the Arnold 
Foundation indicates that longer pretrial detention is associated with new criminal activity even after 
the case is resolved.63 A longitudinal study by the Urban Institute of approximately 700 men exiting 
prison in Illinois, Ohio, and Texas found that only 46 percent were formally employed seven months 
after release.64 Lack of employment and depressed potential earnings due to a conviction can increase 
the probability of prisoners committing new crimes.65
Deteriorating prison conditions can inhibit rehabilitation, thereby increasing recidivism and crime: 
Unsafe or unsanitary prison conditions can interfere with readiness for reentry into society, 
increasing prisoners’ propensity to commit crimes upon release. In 2007, economists M. Keith 
Chen and Jesse Shapiro found that harsher prison conditions lead to more post-release crime.66 This 
is confirmed by the experience in other countries.67 Over the last two decades, prisons have become 
severely overcrowded with poor conditions, poor sanitation, and violence.68 These conditions, 
along with inadequate access to medical care and psychiatric treatment, can lead to deteriorating 
physical and mental health. This can decrease prisoners’ likelihood of reintegrating into society and 
increase the chance of recidivism, more crime, and more incarceration.69
Incarceration may not serve as an effective deterrent to crime: One of the primary purposes of 
punishment is deterrence. Deterrence theory posits that the severity of criminal sanctions dissuades 
other potential offenders from committing crimes out of fear of punishment. This applies both to 
the individual punished, who theoretically decides not to commit future crimes because he was 
incarcerated, and to people in the community who decide not to commit a future crime because 
they know they too may be incarcerated. However, some question whether prison is effective as 
a deterrent to crime.70 Empirical studies have shown that longer sentences have minimal or no 
benefit on whether offenders or potential offenders commit crimes. The National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) concluded that “insufficient evidence exists to justify predicating policy choices 
on the general assumption that harsher punishments yield measurable deterrent effects.”71 NAS 
pointed out that all leading surveys of the deterrence research have reached the same conclusion: 
that “potential offenders may not accurately perceive, and may vastly underestimate, those risks 
and punishments” associated with committing a crime. Some researchers suggest that incarceration 
has even less of a deterrent effect for violent crimes. Unlike property crimes, which offer a financial 
incentive and can replace or supplement legal income, violent crimes are often crimes of passion, 
not premeditated. Therefore, severe terms of incarceration may not affect an offender’s immediate 
decision to engage in criminal behavior.72 
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New State Findings 
The political climate around incarceration policy has shifted. In 2013, criminologists Todd Clear and 
Natasha Frost noted that not too long ago, “[t]here was a time when even a hint of a policy that might 
have resulted in prison releases or reductions in sentencing would have spelled certain political death. 
Today, at least thirteen states are closing prisons after reducing prison populations. That this kind of 
policy is no longer political anathema is a leading indicator of how much has changed.”73 
These recent state reforms have shown that incarceration can decrease without increasing crime. That 
is not the result one would expect if high incarceration rates were an effective tool for crime control. 
This phenomenon is illustrated in Figure 6 for property crime and Figure 7 for violent crime in the 
2000s. Each circle represents a state; the bigger the circle, the more populous the state. The horizontal 
axis is a state’s change in its incarceration rate and the vertical axis is a state’s change in its crime rate. 
The lower left quadrant of the graph shows that many populous states experienced reductions in both 
incarceration and crime in the 2000s.
Figures 6 and 7 reveal several trends in state imprisonment and crime: 
•	 Imprisonment can decrease while crime continues to decrease: In the 2000s, 14 states saw 
declines both in incarceration and crime (both violent and property). As shown in Figure 6, New 
York saw a 26 percent reduction in imprisonment and a 28 percent reduction in property crime. 
Imprisonment and crime both decreased by more than 15 percent in California, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, and Texas. These five states alone represent more than 30 percent 
of the U.S. population. In addition, eight states — Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Utah — lowered their imprisonment 
rates by 2 to 15 percent while experiencing more than a 15 percent decrease in crime.
•	 Imprisonment can increase while crime increases: As shown in Figure 7, 8 of the 10 states 
that experienced increases in violent crime in the 2000s also saw increases in imprisonment. 
Alaska, Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont saw small increases in violent crime (less than 10 
percent), while imprisonment increased. Arkansas and Indiana’s imprisonment rates increased 
over 30 percent, while their violent crime rates increased by about 1 percent.
•	 Imprisonment can increase steeply while crime decreases slightly: As shown in Figures 6 and 
7, crime decreased by less than 10 percent in West Virginia in the 2000s, while imprisonment 
increased by more than 70 percent. In Minnesota, crime decreased by less than 25 percent, 
while imprisonment increased by more than 50 percent.
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Figure 6: Changes in State Imprisonment and Property Crime (2000-2013) 
AL
AK
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI
IDIL
IN
IA KS
KY
LA
ME
MD
MA
MI
MNMS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NY NC
ND
OHOK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TNTX
UT
VT
VA
WA
WI WY
−40%
−30%
−20%
−10%
0%
10%
20%
−30% −20% −10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
Percent Change in Imprisonment Rate
Pe
rc
en
t C
ha
ng
e 
in
 P
ro
pe
rt
y 
Cr
im
e 
Ra
te
Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Rate Reports; U.S. 
Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.74 
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Figure 7: Changes in State Imprisonment and Violent Crime (2000-2013)
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Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.75 
Imprisonment and crime are not consistently negatively correlated. This contradicts the commonly 
held notion that prisons always keep down crime. These trends reveal a more complex relationship, 
consistent with the existence of sharply decreasing marginal returns to incarceration. 
For a more in depth look at these trends, data for a selection of 11 states is presented below. These 
states were chosen based on their significant populations, patterns of incarceration, and differing 
criminal justice reform efforts. The graphs that follow provide an approximation of the effectiveness of 
incarceration at reducing crime in each state. Effectiveness is defined as the percent of crime reduced for 
each one percent increase in incarceration. The graphs apply this report’s national effectiveness finding, 
derived from an analysis of data from all states, to each individual state’s incarceration and crime rate. 
Graphs for all other states and explanation of how these graphs were created can be found in Appendix A.
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California 
•	 California’s prison population has exploded since the mid-1970s, partly driven by sentencing 
policies like the “three strikes you’re out” law enacted in the 1990s. With a prison population 
that increased by 514 percent from 1980 to 2006, the state could not build prisons quickly 
enough to accommodate the growth.76 In 2009, the state’s prisons were at nearly double their 
capacity. In 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court found that California prisoners’ health and safety 
were unconstitutionally compromised.77 It ordered the state to reduce its prison population to 
137.5 percent of capacity (approximately 38,000 to 46,000 prisoners) within two years.78
•	 In 2011, to comply with the Court’s order, Gov. Jerry Brown signed the Public Safety 
Realignment Act. “Realignment” shifted low-level offenders from state prisons to local jail 
facilities and then encouraged release from jail.79 During Realignment’s first two years, counties 
received more than $2 billion to supervise or house additional prisoners in their jails or in 
supervised release.80 A 2012 study by Lofstrom and coauthors indicated that while realignment 
initially reduced the prison population, the reduction has decreased.81 
•	 California’s prison population decreased by 29,500 from 2010 to 2012. It stabilized in 2013, 
decreasing an additional 0.2 percent (or 290 inmates). The state also significantly reduced 
overcrowding in its prisons, from a high of 199 percent of capacity in 2007 to 143 percent 
of capacity in 2013.82 In November 2014, more than 4 million Californians voted in favor of 
Proposition 47, a ballot initiative requiring the sentencing of certain low-level drug and theft 
offenses as misdemeanors and affecting thousands of current and future offenders.83 
•	 As shown in Figure 8, as incarceration rose since 1980, when California had 24,569 prisoners, 
effectiveness of increased incarceration steadily declined. By 1997, imprisonment increased 
five-fold to 132,523 prisoners, and effectiveness on crime declined to essentially zero.84 In 
2013, California had 122,800 prisoners and effectiveness hovered at zero.
Figure 8: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in California (1980-2013)
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
Im
pr
is
on
m
en
t r
at
e
Imprisonment rate
Effectiveness
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
Source: Brennan Center analysis.85
WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE?  |  31
Florida
• By 2010, Florida’s incarceration rate was 38 percent higher than the national average.86 Today,
the Sunshine State has the third largest correctional system in the nation, after California and
Texas.87 Due to “truth in sentencing” legislation passed in 1995, most Florida prisoners must
serve a minimum of 85 percent of their sentences before release.88 Florida, like most states, also
has “three strikes” legislation and a “10-20-life” law, which established mandatory minimum
sentences for crimes involving firearms.89
• Criminal justice reform in Florida has been slow to arrive.90 In 2012, the legislature passed a
law to reduce mandatory minimums for drug offenders, but it was vetoed by Gov. Rick Scott.91
In July 2014, legislation to eliminate mandatory minimums for some low-level drug offenders
became law.92 As the first state to create a drug court in 1989, Florida continues to expand its
use of specialty courts.93 But without major reforms, the state continues to suffer from high
rates of recidivism, probation violations, and juveniles graduating to the adult system.94
• Since 1980, the effectiveness of increased incarceration in Florida, as seen in Figure 9, has
been declining. In 1980, the state’s prison population was 20,735. In 2002, when the prison
population exceeded 75,000, the effectiveness of increased incarceration reached a level that
was effectively zero. By 2013, Florida’s prison population skyrocketed to 103,028.
Figure 9: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Florida (1980-2013)
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Illinois
•	 While some states reduced their prison populations, Illinois’ prison population continued to 
rise. In 2013, however, it decreased slightly (by 700 prisoners), still leaving it with almost 
50,000 prisoners.96 
•	 In 2009, Illinois enacted the Illinois Crime Reduction Act aimed at reducing its prison 
population. The comprehensive reform package was “based on the premise that local 
jurisdictions — judicial circuits or counties — know best what resources are necessary to 
reduce crime.”97 Most notably, it created Adult Redeploy Illinois, a new program to divert 
adults from the state Department of Corrections to alternatives to incarceration. The state 
invested $2 million in incentive funding as awards to counties that use community-based 
diversion programs, instead of prison sentences, for non-violent offenders. The program saved 
an estimated $17 million annually, and in 2014 was expanded to 34 counties, receiving a total 
of $7 million in grant funding.98 Additionally, in 2014, the Illinois legislature acted to increase 
data collection on racial profiling.99
•	 Figure 10 illustrates the declining effectiveness of increased incarceration in Illinois since 1980, 
when the state’s prison population was 11,899. By around 1997, the effectiveness dropped 
to a level that was essentially zero. By this time, the prison population grew to 40,788, a 243 
percent increase from 1980. By 2013, Illinois had 48,653 prisoners with the effectiveness of 
increased incarceration remaining essentially at zero.
Figure 10: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Illinois (1980-2013)
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Louisiana 
• Louisiana has the highest rate of incarceration in the world. One in 75 adult Louisianans
is behind bars, nearly twice the national average.101 In 2013, the Times-Picayune reported
that “Louisiana’s incarceration rate is nearly five times Iran’s, 13 times China’s and 20 times
Germany’s.”102 This is partly due to financial rewards given by the state to local sheriffs to keep
jails full with state prisoners, a perverse incentive that helps fuel incarceration.103 But even in
this prison capital of the world, crime did not fall notably more than in other states.
• Louisiana advanced several legislative reforms in recent years to reduce imprisonment. It
enacted laws in 2011 and 2012 increasing judicial discretion to waive minimum mandatory
sentences, allowing parole officers greater discretion to offer non-prison sanctions for parole
violations, and creating an early release program for elderly prisoners.104 In 2014, the state
enacted HB 791, which increased the monetary threshold necessary to trigger a felony theft
offense from $500 to $750.105 But in a move that will likely increase the prison population,
the law created mandatory minimum sentences of five years for theft of $25,000 or more.
Louisiana also passed a law that will sentence people convicted of selling any amount of heroin
to a mandatory minimum of 10 years — even for a first offense.106
• As shown in Figure 11, the effectiveness of increased incarceration on crime has steadily
declined in Louisiana since 1980, when the state had 8,889 prisoners. Around 2000, the
effectiveness of increased incarceration was essentially zero. At that time, there were 35,207
prisoners. By 2013, there were almost 40,000 prisoners, yet increased incarceration continued
to have almost no effect on reducing crime.
Figure 11: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Louisiana (1980-2013)
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Maryland
• Since 1980, Maryland’s prison population has tripled. With an annual corrections budget
of over $1.2 billion, the state ranks seventh in terms of amount spent per capita on the
justice system.108 The state spends more than 10 times as much on corrections as it does on
education.109 Maryland’s prisons nearly reached their full capacity by 2010, though the prison
population decreased slightly over the last few years.110
• Reform efforts in Maryland have been slow. There have been efforts to shorten parole
lengths based on good behavior, and in April 2014, Gov. Martin O’Malley signed legislation
decriminalizing possession of small amounts of marijuana.111
• The effectiveness of increased incarceration in Maryland dropped suddenly in the early 1980s,
and then seemed to plateau until about 1988. During this time, the prison population nearly
doubled, landing a little above 14,000. After that, the effectiveness fell further until it reached
essentially zero around 1995. By then, the number of prisoners had risen to 21,453. In 2013,
the prison population remained stable — around 21,335 — with the effectiveness remaining
at essentially zero, as shown in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Maryland (1980-2013)
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New Jersey 
•	 The crime rate in New Jersey is about 22 percent lower than the national average.113 Yet the 
state’s prisons hold a higher portion of drug offenders than any other state.114 
•	 Reforms to reduce incarceration have emerged. In 2010, Gov. Jon Corzine signed a reform 
to end mandatory minimums associated with drug free school zones, establishing parole and 
probation as options. In 2013, Gov. Chris Christie and former Gov. Jim McGreevey jointly 
announced programs for mandatory treatment for substance-dependent low-level, nonviolent 
offenders, instead of mandatory jail time.115 Due largely to higher parole rates, reduction in 
parole revocations, and reforms for drug crimes, the state has reduced its imprisonment rate by 
more than 15 percent since its peak in 1999.116 In 2014, a bipartisan effort resulted in a package 
of legislation to reform bail laws. New Jersey has begun planning the reform implementation to 
reduce pre-trial detention. Reform implementation is a multi-year process, which may include 
introduction of risk assessments to make individualized detention decisions, and formation 
of a pretrial services unit in the court system to provide monitoring and counseling for those 
awaiting trial.117
•	 The effectiveness of increased incarceration in New Jersey declined throughout the 1980s, as 
seen in Figure 13. In 1980, there were 5,884 people in prison. By around 1995, when the prison 
population increased nearly five-fold to 27,066 prisoners, the effect of increased incarceration on 
crime had reached a level that was essentially zero. In 2013, the state’s prison population fell to 
23,452 and the effectiveness of incarceration on crime continued to hover at zero.
Figure 13: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in New Jersey (1980-2013)
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New York
•	 In the last decade, the Empire State has reversed its incarceration trend dramatically, dropping 
its prison population by 26 percent since 1999.119 The state was then able to close seven 
facilities in 2011.120 
•	 State imprisonment climbed steadily in the 1980s and 1990s, due in part to former Gov. 
Nelson Rockefeller’s “Rockefeller Drug Laws,” enacted in 1973. These laws aimed to combat 
rising drug use and crime by limiting judicial discretion in sentencing and enacting mandatory 
minimum penalties.121 The state’s prison population then rose steadily, peaking in 1999 at 
72,584 inmates. 
•	 In 2009, the state eliminated mandatory sentences for some drug offenses and reduced 
minimum sentences for others.122 It also increased judicial discretion to provide drug court 
alternatives and introduced robust diversionary programs.123 A decline in felony arrests in New 
York City also contributed to the state’s decreased prison population. Between 1988 and 2008, 
felony arrests decreased by 72 percent in the City.124 Misdemeanor arrests also increased during 
this period, creating other effects on communities.125 In 2014, the state agreed to increase 
public defense funding in five counties to improve the quality of legal representation.126
•	 The effectiveness of increased incarceration in New York, as seen in Figure 14, steadily declined 
through the early 1990s. By around 1995, when the prison population tripled to 68,486, the 
effectiveness of increased incarceration had dropped significantly. By 2013, New York’s prison 
population declined to 53,550 with the effect of incarceration on crime remaining close to zero. 
Figure 14: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in New York (1980-2013)
450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
0.08
0.07
0.06
0.05
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.01
0
Im
pr
is
on
m
en
t r
at
e
Imprisonment rate
Effectiveness
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
Source: Brennan Center analysis.127 
WHAT CAUSED THE CRIME DECLINE?  |  37
Ohio
• In the past 25 years, Ohio’s prison population has more than doubled. Experts found that
increases in the average length of an individual’s time spent incarcerated, in addition to
increased prison admissions, primarily drove this expansion.128
• In 2011, Ohio passed a bipartisan law to reduce its prison population. Among other changes,
the law reduced the maximum sentences for many crimes, including most burglaries and
some drug offenses. It also allowed prisoners to earn time off their sentences by completing
education and mental health programs.129 The state also bolstered statewide community-based
alternatives to prison.130
• Figure 15 depicts the declining effectiveness of increased incarceration in Ohio from 1980,
when the prison population was 13,489. By 1997, when the number of prisoners soared to
48,016, incarceration’s effectiveness had declined to a level that was essentially zero. It remained
essentially zero throughout the 2000s, as the growth in imprisonment slowed. By 2013, with
51,729 prisoners in the state, increased incarceration had negligible effects on crime.
Figure 15: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Ohio (1980-2013)
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Pennsylvania 
•	 As noted by the state itself, “[o]ne in 200 adult Pennsylvanians is currently incarcerated in a 
Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution.”132  With a 2013 crime rate 22 percent lower than 
the national average (and property crimes accounting for approximately 86 percent of crimes 
in the state), Pennsylvania imprisons its citizens at levels only 6 percent lower than the national 
average.133 
•	 In 2012, the state enacted the Criminal Justice Reform Act to reduce reliance on incarceration. 
The law allows parolees to return to community corrections centers, in lieu of state prison when 
they commit parole infractions. It also calls for judges to consider risks posed by individuals 
during sentencing, funds local law enforcement, and provides localities with incentives to 
divert defendants to county jails.134 
•	 As Figure 16 shows, the effectiveness of increased incarceration in Pennsylvania has been steadily 
declining since 1980, when there were 8,171 prisoners. Incarceration’s effectiveness on crime 
reached a level that was essentially zero in 1992, when the prison population was 24,974. In 
2013, there were 50,312 prisoners, yet incarceration’s effectiveness remained essentially zero. 
Figure 16: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Pennsylvania (1980-2013)
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Texas
• The Lone Star State has seen one of the more remarkable shifts in its prison population. In
2004, Texas had the nation’s second highest incarceration rate; it now has the fourth highest
despite a slight uptick in 2013.136 The growth in incarceration largely occurred in the 1990s
and was subsidized by a 205 percent increase in corrections costs since 1990.137
• In 2005, the state provided $55 million in incentive funding for probation departments to use sanctions
other than incarceration to respond to parole violators.138 Two years later, the state budget projection
showed that if the prison rate remained the same, the state would need to spend $500 million on
new prisons.139 Responding to this fiscal pressure, legislators appropriated $241 million to support
an array of alternatives to prison such as: additional substance abuse treatment beds, drug courts,
and mental illness treatment programs.140 In 2009, Texas continued to fund 64 reentry coordinators
in order to improve reentry and reduce recidivism.141 In 2011, the Texas legislature passed two bills,
allowing probationers to reduce the length of their probation by completing treatment programs,
and allowing prisoners to reduce their sentence lengths by completing educational programs.142
Texas’s imprisonment rate decreased by 10.5 percent since its peak in 1999.
• In Texas, the effectiveness of increased incarceration, as seen in Figure 17, has been decreasing
since 1980. Beginning around 1988, the effectiveness started decreasing even more rapidly. At
that time, there were 40,437 prisoners in Texas. By around 1995, when the prison population
reached 127,766, the effectiveness of increased incarceration was essentially zero. It remained
at that level throughout the 2000s. By 2013, there were 168,280 prisoners in Texas, an increase
of approximately 2,000 prisoners from 2012.
Figure 17: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Texas (1980-2013)
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Virginia 
•	 Virginia has the third lowest violent crime rate in the nation.144 Despite this, the state has the 
nation’s 13th highest incarceration rate,145 with one of every 89 adults incarcerated.146 In 1995, 
Virginia eliminated parole and implemented a “truth-in-sentencing” system requiring state 
inmates to serve at least 85 percent of their sentences.147 This led to drastic increases in the 
incarcerated population. 
•	 Efforts to reverse the state’s rising imprisonment rate have focused on reducing or eliminating 
mandatory minimums.148 Yet major reforms have not been enacted.149 And though Gov. Terry 
McAuliffe has indicated he would sign medical marijuana legislation, a bill has not been passed 
by the legislature.150
•	 As Figure 18 shows, the effectiveness of increased incarceration in Virginia has decreased 
steadily since 1980, when Virginia had 8,920 prisoners. Around 2000, it reached its lowest 
levels of effectiveness — essentially zero. In 2000, the incarcerated population was 30,168; by 
2013 it grew to about 37,000 while effectiveness on crime still remained essentially at zero.
Figure 18: Effect of Increased Imprisonment on Crime in Virginia (1980-2013)
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The remainder of Part I presents a brief summary of this report’s analyses and research on each of the 
other 12 variables. Accounting for the role of these variables in the declining crime rate helps to isolate 
the effect of incarceration on crime. This research is presented to provide a general background on the 
drop in crime and to provide context to compare the effects of these variables in relation to the effect 
of incarceration on crime.
2. Increased Police Numbers
Police Numbers & Crime: Based on original analysis and past studies, this report finds that 
increases in the number of police officers had a modest, downward effect on crime in the 1990s, 
likely between 0 and 10 percent. This effect likely became negligible in the 2000s because of a 
plateau and subsequent slight decrease in the number of police officers during that decade. 
As criminologists John Eck and Edward Maguire have noted, “[a]cross time and place, one of the most 
common reactions to increases in crime is to hire more police officers.”152 Just as incarceration surged in 
the 1990s, so did the ranks of police officers across the country, as shown in Figure 19. From 1990 to 
1999, the number of police officers in the U.S. rose 28 percent, from 698,892 to 899,118. From 2000 
to 2012, the rise in number of police officers slowed, but still increased by 3 percent. It then fell by 5 
percent in 2013.153 
Figure 19: Sworn Police Officers in the United States (1980-2013)
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Source: Federal Bureau of Investigations, Uniform Crime Reports; U.S. Department of 
Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.154
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The federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (“1994 Crime Bill”) was one major 
contributor to this uptick in police officer ranks. The $30 billion Congressional package, which funded 
both law enforcement and incarceration, provided funding for 100,000 new local police officers.155 
The 1994 Crime Bill also created the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing 
Services (“COPS Office”), which has provided more than $14 billion in funding to date for localities 
to hire officers, as well as to purchase equipment and technology.156
a. Past Research
Several studies have found that hiring more police can reduce crime. Levitt’s 2002 study, with data 
from 122 cities from 1975 to 1995, found increased police numbers brought down violent crime by 12 
percent and property crime by 8 percent.157 Applying Levitt’s results to the overall crime decline in the 
1990s would attribute 5 to 6 percent of the total crime drop in that decade to increased police hiring.158
In 2000, economists Hope Corman and H. Naci Mocan analyzed data from 1970 to 1996 and found 
a significant effect of police numbers reducing robberies and burglaries, but not on murder or auto 
theft.159 Other studies focusing on specific regions have also found that police numbers affected crime. 
Examining data from Florida in the 1980s and 1990s, criminologists Tomislav Kovandzic and John 
Sloan’s 2002 paper found that increasing police numbers led to fewer robberies, burglaries, and larcenies, 
as well as less overall crime. They found no effect on aggravated assault or murder.160 
More recently, in 2011, University of California, Berkeley Law School professor Franklin Zimring 
published The City that Became Safe. Notably, he used police staffing per homicide as the measure of 
police numbers, instead of the usual measure of police per population. Zimring credited the increasing 
ratio of police per homicide, as well as changing policing tactics, for the large New York City crime 
decline.161 (See Part II for a discussion of Zimring’s work on policing tactics.)
b. New Analysis & Summary of Past Findings
This report includes policing numbers in its regression analysis of crime. As is further explained in 
Appendix B, it relies on data on the number of sworn police officers from the Uniform Crime Reports 
and Bureau of Justice Statistics. 
The authors’ analysis found no statistically significant effect of increases in the number of police on 
crime. One possible reason for this finding is the simultaneity between these two variables, meaning 
policing and crime can affect each other. For example, in response to more crime, a city may hire more 
police; similarly, when that city hires more police, it would expect less crime. It is difficult, statistically 
speaking, to break this simultaneous causal connection and isolate the effect of policing on crime. 
This simultaneity can cause the effect of police numbers on crime and the effect of crime on police 
numbers to, in effect, “cancel out” each other. It is also possible that the number of police officers was 
not great enough over this time period to have a discernible effect on crime. (For a further discussion 
of simultaneity, see Appendix B.) 
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Because of this challenge in their results, the authors looked to previous research on this topic for 
guidance. As noted above, other studies consistently found modest crime-reducing effects of increased 
police officers. Levitt’s 1997 findings on police hiring are among the most cited and well-known analyses 
on this subject.162 He also controlled for the simultaneity effect. Searching for a reliable estimate of the 
effects of police numbers on crime, the authors chose Levitt’s estimate as persuasive among the existing 
research. As noted above, Levitt’s estimates would attribute 5 to 6 percent of the crime drop in the 
1990s to increased police hiring.163 
Based on past studies, alongside the regressions’ results, this report finds that increases in police officer 
ranks had a modest, downward effect on crime in the 1990s, likely 0 to 10 percent. This effect likely 
became negligible in the 2000s because of the plateau and slight decrease in police officer numbers in 
that decade.
3. Use of Death Penalty
Death Penalty & Crime: In line with the past research, the Brennan Center’s empirical analysis 
finds that there is no evidence that executions had an effect on crime in the 1990s or 2000s. 
Capital punishment’s effectiveness in decreasing crime, specifically homicide, has been the subject of 
much inquiry.164 Some believe capital punishment could deter future offenders, thereby decreasing 
crime.165 On the whole, however, research indicates that the death penalty does not have an effect on 
bringing down crime. Empirically, capital punishment is too infrequent to have a measureable effect on 
the crime drop. Criminologically, the existence and use of the death penalty may not even create the 
deterrent effect on potential offenders that lawmakers hoped when enacting such laws.166 
As shown in Figure 20, executions increased fairly steadily from 1990-1999, and reached a peak of 98 
executions in 1999. Since then, executions have fallen to 39 in 2013. 
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Figure 20: Executions in the United States (1980-2013)
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Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.167
a. Past Research
In a well-cited study conducted in 1975, economist Isaac Ehrlich estimated each additional execution 
resulted in approximately seven or eight fewer murders.168 Writing more recently, economists Mocan 
and R. Kaj Gittings similarly estimated that five fewer murders would result per one execution.169 In 
a 2007 Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, David Muhlhausen of the Heritage Foundation testified 
that economist Hashem Dezhbakhsh and coauthors found each individual execution could result in as 
many as 18 fewer murders.170
The large body of empirical work, however, suggests that capital punishment has not been effective 
in reducing crime. For example, in 2003, economists Levitt, Lawrence Katz, and Ellen Shustorovich 
conducted an empirical analysis finding that capital punishment had no deterrent effect on crime in 
the 1990s.171 Their theory essentially runs as follows: in order for capital punishment to depress crime, 
it would need to be a crime deterrent. When considering the effect of capital punishment on the 
potential commission of a homicide, the potential offender must consider the probability he would be 
caught, the probability he would be charged, the probability he would be convicted, the probability he 
would receive a death sentence, and the probability that he would be executed. After multiplying these 
probabilities together, the potential offender realizes a small probability of execution occurring, and 
therefore the possibility of being executed would essentially never affect a criminal decision.172 
Moreover, it is debatable whether an individual even engages in such objective calculations before 
committing a crime. Much psychological and sociological research suggests that many criminal acts are 
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crimes of passion or committed in a heated moment based only on immediate circumstances, and thus 
potential offenders may not consider or weigh longer-term possibilities of punishment and capture, 
including the possibility of capital punishment.173 Donohue and economist Justin Wolfers conducted 
tests to determine the strength of various analytical models used in past research. They found that the 
past findings of a deterrent effect were weak.174 They reasoned that executions were too scarce to have a 
plausible deterrent effect on crime.175 
Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, 34 states have executed citizens. But since 1990, only 
20 percent of states carried out more than five executions per year, and only three — Texas, Oklahoma, 
and Virginia — have executed more than 10 people in any given year.176 Taking Ehrlich’s high estimate 
of the effect of death penalty on crime at face value, there were 39 executions nationwide in 2013, 
which would have prevented 312 murders out of the 14,196, about 2 percent.177 Even if the highest 
findings were true, capital punishment could still not explain a meaningful fraction of the aggregate 
drop in crime.178
b. New Analysis & Summary of Past Findings
In line with much of the past research, this report finds that the use of the death penalty has no significant 
effect on crime. This report’s regression analysis includes annual, state-level data on executions from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics for all 50 states and the District of Columbia.179 
The findings show a very weak negative relationship between the use of the death penalty and crime that 
is essentially zero. The same is true for the effect of the use of the death penalty on homicides specifically. 
Capital punishment played no appreciable role in the crime drops in the 1990s or the 2000s. 
4. Enactment of Right-to-Carry Gun Laws
Right-to-Carry Gun Laws & Crime: Consistent with the most accepted past studies, this report 
did not find evidence that right-to-carry gun laws affected crime in the 1990s or 2000s. 
Some have theorized that laws that increase gun rights could affect crime by affecting the number of 
legal guns on the streets. A common type of gun rights law is a “right-to-carry” gun law. Right-to-carry 
laws grant citizens the presumptive right to carry concealed handguns in public, thereby loosening 
gun control restrictions. The increased presence of guns in public might be thought to affect crime in 
some way. Open carry laws, which grant citizens the presumptive right to openly carry a gun, may also 
have their own deterrent effect. Concealed carry laws are more popular than open carry as a theory of 
potential crime deterrence, and therefore this section focuses on concealed carry laws.
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Figure 21: States with Right-to-Carry Laws (1980-2013)
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Source: Brennan Center research.180
As Figure 21 shows, the number of states with right-to-carry laws has grown steadily. These laws allow 
governments to issue permits to allow gun owners to conceal their guns when they are brought out in 
the public, rather than having to keep them visible and in the open. Right-to-carry laws fall under two 
broad categories. “Lenient right-to-carry laws” (also called “shall issue” laws) are more lenient with the 
requirements for receiving a concealed carry permit; almost everyone who meets certain criteria can 
receive one. Arkansas, for example, enacted a lenient law in 2013, that made it legal for citizens to carry 
a weapon as long as the individual did not intend to use it in the commission of a crime.181  “Restrictive 
right-to-carry laws” (also called “may issue” laws) require that the individual receiving the permit have a 
legitimate reason for needing it. Massachusetts, for example, enacted a restrictive law in 1998 allowing 
citizens to obtain a license to carry, at the discretion of the police, if the applicant proves good character, 
good cause, and residency.182
Most states over the past few decades have shifted towards enacting lenient right-to-carry laws rather 
than restrictive ones. Figure 21 depicts this trend in two ways: the rise in lenient right-to-carry laws and 
the rise in all right-to-carry laws (lenient and restrictive). The number of states with any right-to-carry 
law has more than doubled from 1990 to 2013, growing from 21 to 46 states. Those with lenient laws 
increased from 15 to 38 over the same period.
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a. Past Research 
The consensus in the past research is that right-to-carry laws do not prevent crimes and can even cause 
increases in crime. The National Rifle Association posits that laws allowing the concealed carrying 
of firearms deter crime. This “more guns, less crime” hypothesis maintains that if potential offenders 
suspect that a potential victim is more likely to have a concealed firearm, the commission of the crime 
may be less appealing. 
In a widely cited paper, economists John Lott and David Mustard made precisely this argument. They 
concluded that if states without right-to-carry laws all implemented them, it would prevent almost 
1,600 murders annually.183 They also suggested that such laws would sizably reduce other violent 
crimes. Furthermore, they argued this result is accomplished with no increase in accidental deaths. 
Though Lott went on to publish a well-known book on the subject with the University of Chicago 
Press,184 his research has come under criticism. As noted by scholars, when “other researchers delved 
into Lott’s findings, they found no credible evidence that the passage of right-to-carry laws decreases 
or increases violent crime.”185 Empiricists, including Levitt, found serious quantitative deficiencies 
in Lott’s work.186 In 2004, the National Academy of Sciences published a study highlighting these 
deficiencies, specifically focusing on the imprecision in Lott’s results.187 
Other researchers have found evidence of a “more guns, more crime” effect.188 Mark Duggan found 
in 2001 that gun ownership generally increases the homicide rate, though right-to-carry laws do not 
increase gun ownership and therefore have no effect on crime. 189 Similarly, Donahue and economist 
Ian Ayres showed in 2003 that these laws may increase the robbery rate.190 They also measure the effect 
of right-to-carry laws on other types of crimes and found that states with these laws are associated with 
higher levels of property crime.191 In 2013, Michael Siegel and his coauthors found that for every 1 
percent increase in gun ownership, one could expect a 0.9 percent increase in gun-related homicides.192 
b. New Analysis & Summary of Past Findings
This report’s analysis included whether a state had a right-to-carry law. The authors created two different 
variables to capture the variety of these laws across states as indicated in Figure 22. Using either variable 
resulted in effectively the same findings.193 
This report found no evidence that right-to-carry gun laws brought down crime in the 1990s or 2000s. 
This result is consistent with the most respected studies on the subject.
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B. ECONOMIC FACTORS
5. Unemployment
Unemployment & Crime: Consistent with the larger body of research, this report finds that the 
decrease in unemployment in the 1990s was responsible for about 0 to 5 percent of that decade’s 
crime drop. Increases in unemployment in the 2000s were responsible for a slight but negligible 
increase in crime during that decade.
Theoretically, unemployment could have a positive or negative effect on crime. On the one hand, 
higher unemployment may lead to an increase in crime, especially “for-profit” and property crimes. On 
the other hand, higher unemployment may decrease attractive potential victims of property crime, thus 
possibly reducing the occurrence of such crimes.194
Figure 22: Unemployment in the United States (1980-2013)
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics195
As shown in Figure 22, unemployment has fluctuated in recent history. In the 1990s, unemployment 
steadily declined. In the 2000s unemployment fluctuated but saw a steep increase after the recession 
of 2008.
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a. Past Research 
On the whole, research indicates that a decrease in unemployment leads to a small decrease in crime. 
Similarly, an increase in unemployment leads to a slight increase in crime.196 
Criminologists Shawn Bushway and Peter Reuter in 2004 — as well as Richard Freeman in 1999 — 
have provided overviews of this past research, finding that job training and unemployment may have 
some effect on crime.197 Levitt’s 2001 study found that an increase in local unemployment rates leads 
to an increase in property crime.198 Raphael and Winter-Ebmer’s 2001 study similarly provided strong 
evidence that an increase in unemployment increased property crime, but did not find similar evidence 
for violent crimes.199 Overall, these studies suggest that increased unemployment has a modest effect 
on increasing crime.
b. New Analysis & Summary of Past Findings
This report’s analysis includes data on unemployment. These annual, state-level data are collected 
through the Federal Reserve Economic Data database.200 
The analysis finds a positive, but modest, effect of unemployment on crime, consistent with the larger 
body of past findings. At best estimate, the decrease in unemployment in the 1990s was responsible 
for 2 percent of that decade’s crime drop, but this effect could range from 0 to 5 percent. Increases in 
unemployment in the 2000s were responsible for a small but negligible increase in crime in that decade. 
As explained above, scholars have theorized that unemployment increases incentives to commit “for-
profit” crimes. It could also increase depression or feelings of despair that could lead to more crime.
6. Growth in Income
Income & Crime: In line with the past body of research, this report finds that increases in per 
capita income were responsible for 5 to 10 percent of the decreases in crime in both the 1990s and 
the 2000s. 
Growth in income, like unemployment, could theoretically increase or decrease crime. Higher legal 
income can decrease an incentive to engage in illegal activity to gain profits, thereby depressing crime. 
On the other hand, higher income could theoretically increase the likelihood of crime, as Levitt argues, 
due to increased crime opportunities.201 For example, for an individual to steal a car, another person 
must be able to afford a car. When incomes are higher, there may be more cars, and therefore more 
opportunities for theft to occur.
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Figure 23: Median Household Income in the U.S. (1980-2013)
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Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis.202
As shown in Figure 23, median household income has fluctuated over time. There was a considerable 
increase in the mid-1990s, and a sharp decline recently, associated largely with the 2008 recession. 
a. Past Research
On the whole, research indicates that a growth in income leads to a modest decrease in crime. There 
are several ways to study the effect of income on crime. Some researchers consider the effect of median 
income, while others look at the effect of income inequality. 
In Levitt’s 1999 study, he used median income as the measure and found that property crime had 
become increasingly concentrated on victims with lower incomes. He argued that this may be due 
to security measures, including home security systems, which are increasingly available to those with 
higher incomes.203
Additional studies consider the effect of other income-related factors, including the minimum wage, 
poverty levels, economic inequality and segregation, and homelessness on crime. They generally find 
analogous trends. In 1991, criminologist E. Britt Patterson found that more concentrated poverty is 
associated with higher rates of serious violent crime, but that income inequality was not.204 Criminologist 
John Hipp found that areas with high levels of inequality and more economic segregation had much 
higher levels of property crime (such as burglaries and motor vehicle thefts) regardless of racial 
composition.205 
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Traditional economic theory argues that higher minimum wages can lead to higher unemployment, 
because when minimum-wage employees cost more to hire, there are fewer jobs available at the higher 
wage rate. In an analysis in the 1980s grounded in this logic, economist Masanori Hashimoto found 
that higher minimum wages increased property crimes committed by teenagers but had no effect on 
violent crime by teenagers. He also found they had no effect on crimes committed by young adults ages 
20 to 24.206 Economists continue to debate the real world application of this theory. Some argue that 
increasing the minimum wage increases unemployment, while others have found that increasing the 
minimum wage does not increase unemployment.207
b. New Analysis & Summary of Past Findings
In accordance with the larger body of research, this report’s analysis includes the effect of income on 
crime in the form of median per capita income. The dataset includes annual, state-level median income 
data, for the 50 states and the District of Columbia, gathered from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis via the Federal Reserve Economic Data database.208 
This report finds a significant negative relationship between income and crime: the higher the average 
income in the state, the lower the crime rate. Specifically, the authors estimate that the increase in per 
capita income was responsible for 5 to 10 percent of the decrease in crime in the 1990s. Though there 
was a decline in income after 2008, median income increased from 2000 to 2013.  This overall increase 
in income was responsible for 5 to 10 percent of the decrease in crime in the 2000s. This finding 
comports with the past body of research on the effect of income on crime. 
7. Inflation 
Inflation & Crime: Based on past research, the authors believe that inflation likely had some effect 
on the drop in property crime in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Other, less obvious, economic measures may also affect crime. One example is the rate of inflation. 
Existing studies indicate that a decrease in inflation could lead to a drop in property crime. 
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Figure 24: U.S. Inflation Rate (1980-2013)
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau.209
As shown in Figure 24, inflation has fluctuated nationally around 2 to 3 percent since 1982. Inflation 
is defined as the year over year percent increase in the national Consumer Price Index. The notable 
exception is the sharp drop and increase between 2008 and 2010, prompted by the recession of 2008.
a. Past Research
Inflation has not been an oft researched subject. The research that exists indicates that inflation has the 
effect of increasing property crime, but does not affect violent crime. 
As explained by criminologist Richard Rosenfeld, “[c]rime rates tend to rise during inflationary periods 
and fall, or experience a slower increase, when the inflation rate drops,” and moreover, “[p]rice increases 
make cheap, stolen goods more attractive and therefore strengthen incentives for those who supply the 
underground markets with stolen goods. The reverse occurs when inflation is low.”210 Economists Alan 
Seals and John Nunley similarly found that inflation has a statistically significant effect on increasing 
property crime.211 The higher the inflation rate, the higher the property crime rate. They concluded that 
inflation stability can considerably reduce property crime. 
b. Analysis of Past Findings
Inflation data are recorded as the change in the Consumer Price Index as collected by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. The data are available annually and broken down into four regions of the United 
States (south, northeast, west, and midwest). It is not available for each state and therefore could not 
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be included in the state-level national regression analysis.212 Other research used national or regional 
regressions and therefore included this data. 
The authors therefore analyzed past research on this theory. While it seems likely that changing inflation 
had some effect on the drop in crime, more research is needed to quantify that contribution. Based 
on the body of past research, the authors believe that inflation likely had some effect on the drop in 
property crime, yet are unable to quantify it due to lack of data that can be added into this report’s state-
level annual dataset and analysis. Forthcoming work by Rosenfeld may provide a more precise estimate 
showing that lower levels of inflation likely helped bring down crime in the 1990s and 2000s.213 
8. Consumer Confidence
Consumer Confidence & Crime. Based on past research, the authors find that consumer 
confidence likely brought down property crime in both the 1990s and the 2000s. 
Consumer confidence is an economic measure, which uses survey data to determine whether consumers 
are optimistic about the economy and future growth.214
Figure 25: Consumer Confidence Index (1980-2013)
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Source: Thomson Reuters and University of Michigan, Surveys of Consumers.215
Note: This figure depicts consumer sentiment as a percentage of its 1985 level. This allows fluctuation over 
time to be observed.
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As shown in Figure 25, consumer confidence has fluctuated, sometimes dramatically, over the past 20 
years. A prolonged increase occurred throughout the 1990s, and sharply decreased in the late 2000s 
consistent with the 2008 recession.
a. Past Research
There are a handful of studies on this topic that indicate a rise in consumer confidence can lead to a 
decrease in some property crimes.
Rosenfeld and criminologist Robert Fornango’s 2007 study found that an increase in consumer confidence 
in the 1990s was responsible for about 35 percent of the decrease in robbery between 1992 and 2000.216 
They found similarly large effects of increased consumer confidence on bringing down rates of burglary, 
larceny, and motor vehicle theft.217 Rosenfeld and Fornango used the Index of Consumer Sentiment in 
lieu of traditional economic indicators, such as unemployment, arguing that survey respondents are “more 
reliable guides to their own perceptions of economic conditions than researchers.”218 
However, respondents could easily “misjudge the timing or significance of various economic conditions,” 
which could skew these results to find an effect larger than actually present.219 In addition, technological 
advances in anti-theft surveillance likely affected rates of burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, 
possibly more so than the effect of consumer confidence.220 Rosenfeld and Fornago do not control for 
the effect of these technological changes or certain other variables. For these reasons, among others, the 
effect of consumer confidence on crime could be smaller than projected in this study.
b. Analysis of Past Findings
Like inflation, data are available annually and broken down into four regions of the United States 
(south, northeast, west, and midwest). Other researchers used regional or national analysis and could 
therefore use this data. This data is not at the individual state level.221 The authors therefore analyzed 
past research to understand the effect of consumer confidence on the crime rate. 
This report finds that Rosenfeld and Fornango’s results and other economic and sociological theory 
indicate that an increase in consumer confidence likely had some effect on reducing property crime. 
Increasing consumer confidence in the 1990s could have had an effect on reducing crime for certain 
property crimes. Consumer confidence likely also had some effect on the property crime drop in the 
2000s. It likely had a crime-increasing effect as confidence fell through the early part of the decade, and 
a crime-reducing effect as confidence rose through the later part.
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C. SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
9. Decreased Alcohol Consumption
Alcohol & Crime: In line with past research, this report finds that decreased alcohol consumption 
decreases crime. However, because alcohol consumption did not change significantly during 
the 1990s and 2000s, it did not produce a large shift in crime. A decrease in per capita alcohol 
consumption led to a 5 to 10 percent decrease in crime during both decades. 
One popular theory discussed in research is the effect of alcohol consumption on crime.222 
As shown in Figure 26, alcohol consumption slowly but steadily declined from 1980 to 2000, and has 
gradually increased since then. This recent increase has been driven by an increase in the consumption 
of wine and spirits, while beer consumption has been steady or falling.
Figure 26: Alcohol Consumption Per Capita (1980-2012)
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a. Past Research
Overall, research indicates that an increase in alcohol consumption contributes to an increase in crime. 
Sara Markowitz’s 2000 National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) study and Susan Martin’s 2001 
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism study are among the most influential.224 These 
studies found a positive correlation between alcohol consumption and crime. Today, the National 
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Partnership on Alcohol Misuse and Crime reports that 40 percent of state prisoners convicted of 
violent crimes were under the influence of alcohol at the time of their offense.225 Another recent study 
found that for every 10 percent increase in the concentration of bars in a neighborhood, there is a 
corresponding 2 percent increase in the violent crime rate.226 
b. New Analysis & Summary of Past Findings
To examine the effects of alcohol on crime, this report’s dataset included data provided by the National 
Institutes of Health on gallons of ethanol sold (in the form of beer) per person per year in each state 
from 1980 to 2012.227 Data for 2013 were not available at the time of publication and therefore could 
not be included in this report’s analysis. The authors therefore used a projection for the 2013 data.228
The amount of beer sold was chosen as the data source for alcohol consumption for several reasons. 
It is the most common form of alcohol consumption and generally tracks trends overall alcohol 
consumption. It is also a common method through which social scientists examine this variable; using 
the same measure allows for comparison of results. Scholars have also found connections between beer 
consumption in particular and crime.229 
The authors’ analysis found that alcohol consumption increases crime. However, because alcohol 
consumption did not change significantly during the 1990s and 2000s (it declined by less than 1 
percent in the 1990s and 2000s), it did not produce a large shift in crime in those decades. Of the crime 
drop in the 1990s, 7.5 percent can be attributed to a decrease in per capita alcohol consumption; this 
effect could range from 5 to 10 percent. The same holds true for the effect of alcohol consumption on 
crime in the 2000s. Overall, this is a statistically significant positive effect, meaning that as alcohol use 
declines, crime declines. 
10. Aging Population
Age & Crime: This report finds that between 2 to 3 percent of the crime drop in the 1990s can 
be attributed to a decrease in people aged 15 to 29; this effect could statistically range from 0 to 5 
percent. Because there was essentially no change in the proportion of this age group from 2000 to 
2010, age did not have an effect on the crime drop in the 2000s. This correlation between age and 
crime is consistent with past research. 
The distribution of age in a population has been studied as a potentially important determinant of 
crime rates.230 It is commonly believed that the younger a region’s population on the whole, the more 
crimes will be committed. Young adults, specifically those between the ages of 15 and 24, commit the 
vast majority of crimes and are also victimized at a much higher rate.231 It is natural to expect, then, that 
an aging population would experience lower crime rates. 
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Figure 27: Decrease in Young People in the Population (1980-2013)
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Figure 27 shows the change in the percent of “young people” (defined as individuals between ages 15 to 
30) of the total population. The percentage of young people decreased from 31 percent in 1980 to 26
percent in 1990 to 24 percent in 2000, before landing at 23 percent in 2013. Overall, the median age 
in the U.S. has been rising with every census, from 29.5 in 1960 to 37.5 in 2013.233 
a. Past Research
Most of the past research on this theory, conducted by economists and sociologists, found that commission 
of crimes does indeed vary with age. 
In 1983, sociologists Travis Hirshi and Michael Goffredson observed that age and crime were correlated 
and that this relationship did not vary significantly across time or place.234 In 1993, they identified 
self-control as the connection between age and propensity to commit crime, noting that self-control 
increases with age.235 In 2003, sociologists Charles Tittle, David Ward, and Harold Grasmick challenged 
the self-control theory, concluding that age and gender were better predictors of criminal deviance than 
self-control. Specifically, they found that males were more likely than females to commit crimes, and 
18- to 24-year-olds were more likely than their elders to commit crimes. 236
In 1999, Levitt found a relationship between age and the likelihood of committing crime.237 He identified 
individuals between the ages of 15 to 24 as the most likely to commit crime. He found that the aging 
population accounted for 12 percent of the decline in violent crime and 18 percent of the decline in 
property crime between 1980 and 1995. Levitt predicted that aging demographics between 1995 and 
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2010 would lead to a reduction in violent crime by 1 to 2 percent and property crime by 5 to 6 percent.238 
In 2008, Rosenfeld and Alfred Blumstein cited the aging of the postwar “Baby Boomer” generation out of 
the high-crime age bracket, which occurred around 1980, as a turning point in crime trends.239 
There are myriad explanations among researchers and academics for this age-crime relationship.240 
Young adults tend to have fewer responsibilities, such as being the primary wage-earner or a parent, 
which can inhibit crime. Younger people may also spend more free time outside the home, thereby 
exposing themselves to more opportunities to commit crime. Young people may also simply be more 
predisposed to take risks, which include committing crimes, and have less overall impulse control and 
less mature decision-making skills.241 
b. New Analysis & Summary of Past Findings
This report’s regression included data provided by the U.S. Census on age distributions.242 The data 
were in percentage of the population in each young adult age group: 15-19, 20-24, and 25-30, in 
each state from 1980 to 2013. Grouping ages in a regression analysis is a common way to reveal age 
distribution effects. 
This report finds that between 2 to 3 percent of the crime drop in the 1990s can be attributed to a 
decrease in people aged 15 to 30. This result could range from 0 to 5 percent. There was a noticeable 
decline in adolescents and young adults as a percentage of the population from 1990 to 2000. However, 
there was essentially no change in the proportion of the population aged 15 to 30 from 2000 to 2013. 
Age distribution was therefore not a major factor in the drop in crime in the 2000s. 
Breaking down this finding further, the analysis shows no significant impact of 15 to 19 year olds on 
crime rates. However, it does indicate a significant and positive correlation between 20- to 24-year-olds 
and 25- to 30-year-olds and crime.243 Specifically, a 1 percent decrease in the percentage of these young 
adults in the population is associated with a roughly 0.3 percent decrease in crime. From 1990 to 2000, 
the percent of Americans in these two age ranges fell 2.9 percent, which would be associated with a 0.78 
percent decline in crime. From 2000 to 2013, the percent of young adults actually rose slightly, by 0.2 
percent, which would be associated with a very small (0.06 percent) increase in crime. 
This report’s findings that age and crime are correlated are in line with past research on the topic. 
11. Decreased Crack Use
Decreased Crack Use & Crime: The authors do not draw a conclusion on this theory because they 
could not secure complete state-level data on this variable for the years 1980 to 2013. Based on the 
past body of research, the authors believe that the decline in crack use could have played a role in 
the drop in violent crime in the 1990s.244 Given that widespread crack use had largely receded by 
the 2000s, it likely had no effect on the crime drop in that decade.
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In the mid-1980s, cocaine use increased in major cities.245 This particularly occurred in the form of 
“crack” cocaine, a diluted form of powder cocaine cooked with a variety of substances resulting in 
“nuggets” that can be easily sold and smoked.246 Because the diluted product is cheaper and easier to sell 
on urban streets, it is associated with an increase in drug use and sales in the 1980s, commonly referred 
to as the “the crack epidemic.”
Some have suggested the decline in the use of crack contributed to the decline in violent crime, 
especially homicides.
a. Past Research
There is research suggesting that increased crack use led to increased homicides in the early 1990s. 
For example, Levitt asserted in 2004 that the homicide rate for young black males more than tripled 
between 1985 and 1993 due to increased crack use.247 He also argued that as crack use declined in the 
late 1990s and 2000s, it caused a decrease in homicide rates and other violent crime.248 
Researchers believe that crack use can increase crime either through its “psychopharmacological” effects 
— the drug may cause violent or irrational behavior in users — or due to “economic-compulsive” 
violence — whereby users turn to crime to support a drug habit.249 Some studies find that crack use and 
distribution increased crime and violence primarily due to disputes over crack sales.250 
Blumstein and Rosenfeld identify two turning points with respect to crack and crime trends. The first is 
a rise in young people participating in the crack sales around 1985 and the concurrent increase in gun 
violence. Second, they note the decline in crack use and demand around 1993, which coincided with a 
robust economy and shrinking unemployment.251 
Studies have also focused on crack use in specific cities. In a 1997 paper, social scientist Paul Goldstein 
and coauthors attributed 25 percent of homicides in New York City in 1988 to crack.252 They argued 
the causes of many homicides were disputes over crack distribution. Then, as crack use waned, they 
posited that it had some effect on the declining homicide and violent crime rates.
b. Summary of Past Findings
Reliable data on crack cocaine use are not easy to obtain. Crack was not widespread before the early- 
to mid-1980s, and there was a lag before researchers realized its destructive potential. There has been 
some effort to assemble a measure of crack’s prevalence. For example, Roland Fryer and his coauthors 
constructed a “crack index,” based on newspaper mentions, hospital admissions, and other data in 2005.253 
The authors could not secure data on the crack cocaine epidemic at the state level. The authors were 
therefore unable to include this variable in their regression. 
The main source of drug-use data — the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse which was replaced 
by the National Survey on Drug Use and Health in 2002 — provides national level data and does not 
include state-by-state data. It also began collecting data on crack in 1988 — after crack epidemic was 
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well underway, making it more difficult to see how the waxing and waning of the epidemic affected 
crime.254 Other researchers were able to include this data in their analyses because they performed 
national analyses on years after 1988 or conducted their own surveys to gather the data. 
Based on past research, the authors believe that the decline in crack use could have played some role 
in the drop in violent crime in the 1990s. Given that widespread crack use had largely receded by the 
2000s, it likely had no effect on the crime drop in that decade.
12. Legalization of Abortion
Legalized Abortion & Crime: The authors do not draw a conclusion on this theory because they 
could not secure complete state-level data on this variable for all the years examined. Based on past 
research, it is possible that legalized abortion could have affected the crime decline in the 1990s. 
However, even if there was any such effect, it likely waned in the 2000s. The first cohort that would 
have been theoretically affected by abortion, 10 years after the 1990s, would be well beyond the 
most common crime committing age in the 2000s. 
One of the most controversial theories for the crime decline, as well as one of the most researched, is 
the legalization of abortion.
a. Past Research
In a widely cited and much discussed study, Levitt and Donohue argued in 2001 that there was a causal 
link between the legalization of abortion, by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade, 
and the subsequent drop in crime in the 1990s.255 Levitt noted that this hypothesis was first mentioned 
in 1990, by former Minneapolis police chief Anthony Bouza.256 Levitt and Donohue attributed as 
much as half of the 1990s crime drop to legalized abortion.257 Levitt’s subsequent 2004 study attributed 
about a third of crime reduction to abortion.258 This large attribution to legalized abortion for the 
crime decline has been seconded by other researchers, including economists Jessica Reyes, Anindya Sen 
(writing about Canada), and Christian Pop-Eleches (writing about Romania). 259
This theory relies on several assumptions. First, it assumes that children born from unwanted pregnancies 
are, on average, more likely to commit crime when they become adolescents or adults.260 Second, the 
argument assumes that women are more likely to obtain abortions if their pregnancy was unwanted. 
It then assumes that abortions increased significantly after 1973, which caused the number of children 
born from unwanted pregnancies to decrease significantly. Some point to a decrease in the number 
of children placed for adoption after abortion was legalized as evidence of this theory.261 The theory 
further argues that this cohort of children would have been more likely to commit crimes in the 1990s, 
when they would have been of crime committing age. Yet, since these children were not born, these 
crimes did not occur. 
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Levitt and Donohue’s study has been debated and attacked by many scholars. Economist Ted Joyce 
criticized the authors’ failure to consider illegal and underreported abortion and fertility rates, especially 
before Roe. Joyce states: “As a simple example, Kansas had an abortion ratio of 414 per 1,000 live births 
in 1973. However, data collected by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) . . . indicate that Kansas 
had an observed abortion ratio of 369 per 1,000 live births in 1972!”262 Thus, in reality, there might 
not have been the dramatic increase in abortions after Roe that Donohue and Levitt hypothesized. If 
true this would undermine their argument that many children who were predisposed to committing 
crimes were not born. 
Zimring has expressed criticism of Levitt and Donohue’s methodology and findings. In a well-respected 
2006 study, Zimring performed his own empirical analysis to account for state variation and found 
no evidence of an effect of abortion legalization on crime.263 Comparing the city-level, national, and 
international crime declines in the 1990s, Zimring drew from and challenged past empirical analyses 
and notions about the factors affecting crime.264
Additional criticism comes from Rosenfeld, Blumstein, and researcher Joel Wallman who contended 
that the offending rates of age groups do not line up with the abortion theory. Adolescent violent and 
property crime rates did not decline until 1994, when the first cohort after legalization of abortion 
turned 21. If national legalization impacted crime, they argued crime rates should have fallen much 
sooner because the likelihood of offending increases significantly in the mid-to-late teens.265 
b. Analysis of Past Findings
The authors do not draw a conclusion on this theory because they could not secure data on this variable 
on a state-level for all the years of data included in the regression. Data on incidents of legal abortions 
in states are collected by the Guttmacher Institute. Guttmacher did not have data for 16 years between 
1980 and 2014 (These are: 1983, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1993-98, 2001-03, 2006, 2009-11).266 Other 
researchers were able to include this data in their analysis because they conducted national level analysis, 
their models did not account for all the years between 1980 and 2014, or they gathered their own data.
Based on an analysis of the past findings, it is possible that some portion of the decline in 1990s could 
be attributed to the legalization of abortion. However, there is also robust research criticizing this theory.
Even if the abortion theory is valid, it is unlikely that an increase in abortions had much effect on a crime 
drop in the 2000s. The first cohort that would have been theoretically affected by abortion, 10 years 
after the 1990s, would be well beyond the most common crime committing ages in the 2000s. Based on 
available data, the frequency of abortions appears to currently be fairly constant. Since the variable does 
not appear to be shifting, a change in crime would not be expected. Although it may have had some small 
residual effect, there would likely be no effect on the 2000s drop attributed to legalized abortion. 
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13. Decreased Lead in Gasoline
Unleading of Gasoline & Crime: The authors do not draw a conclusion on this theory because 
they could not secure complete data on this variable on a state-level for all the years needed for 
their empirical analysis. Based on past body of research and expert reactions, it is possible that lead 
played some role in the 1990s violent crime decline. However, lead’s effect on crime likely waned 
in the 2000s, as there was no dramatic change in lead rates after 1985. People born after that year 
experienced less of a sharp decline in exposure to lead, therefore lead presumably had less of an 
effect on their propensity to commit crimes in the 2000s. 
A decrease in the lead in gasoline after the passage of the federal Clean Air Act is another popular, yet 
controversial, theory.
a. Past Research
In a widely cited 2007 paper, Amherst College economist Jessica Reyes linked the removal of lead from 
gasoline after the 1970 Clean Air Act to the precipitous drop in crime in the 1990s. Her argument is as 
follows. After passage of the Act, gasoline manufacturers began to remove lead from gasoline.267 Lead, 
used as an octane booster, is a highly toxic metal. Exposure to lead has been linked to lower I.Q. scores. 
It can lead to cognitive and behavioral problems, as well as aggressive behavior.268 The first generation 
of individuals not exposed to leaded gasoline (which happened during 1975 to 1985) reached the most 
common violent crime committing ages in the 1990s (defined by Reyes as 22). 
Reyes, and other researchers, have found that lead is connected to aggressive behavior and behavioral 
problems because it affects brain development of children. Children absorb lead into their systems by 
breathing lead in the air, which mainly comes from automobile exhaust. Reyes and others argue that 
these propensities then tend to lead to an increased propensity to commit violent crime. Reyes argues 
that the post Clean Air Act cohort was less likely to have cognitive or behavioral problems, since they 
were not exposed to lead, and therefore were less likely to commit crimes when they came of age in the 
1990s than previous generations. 
Reyes found that the decrease in lead caused a remarkable 56 percent of the decrease in violent crime 
in the 1990s. When examining state-specific trends, her findings gave lead credit for a much lower 
17 percent of the violent crime decline. Reyes did not find a significant effect of lead abatement on 
property crime in the 1990s.
This theory had been previously suggested by another economist, Rick Nevin, in 1999. He illustrated 
a similarity in the trends between violent crime and gasoline lead 23 years prior.269 The lead theory 
has also been popularized widely in the news media. Mother Jones, for one, highlighted the theory in 
an early 2013 article entitled “America’s Real Criminal Element: Lead,” which, in part, profiled the 
research of Reyes and Nevin.270
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In December 2013, an NAS roundtable discussed the lead theory.271 There was an extended discussion 
in which most participants seemed to concur that the 56 percent drop in crime attributed to lead by 
Reyes was likely too large. Most experts seem to believe that lead played some role, but maybe not as 
high as the finding presented by Reyes. More research is needed to establish lead’s precise role in the 
crime decline.
b. Summary of Past Findings
The authors do not draw a conclusion on this theory because they could not secure complete state-by-
state data on this variable level for 1980 to 2013, as needed for the regression. The U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency does not collect data on the amount of lead in gasoline at the state level. National 
level data exist since at least 1980.272 Reyes used an original dataset to conduct her study, and the 
authors could not recover this data from her.
Based on current research and expert reactions, it is possible that lead played some role in the 1990s drop 
in violent crime but perhaps not as large as that found by Reyes. Further, lead’s effect on the crime drop 
likely waned in the 2000s. While reduced lead levels in gasoline may continue to depress crime rates, it 
likely has a minimal role in this decade. The prevalence of lead in gasoline has been at consistently lower 
levels since the early 1990s. Thus, individuals who were around age 22 in the 2000s were exposed to 
consistently low rates of lead similar to previous cohorts. Thus, because there was not much change in the 
prevalence of lead in gasoline, it likely had little effect on propensity to commit crime. 
***
This section concludes this report’s state-level analysis on 13 theories about the crime decline, with a 
focus on the effect of incarceration.
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CITY-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF CRIME
CompStat & Crime: Based on original empirical analysis conducting the first nationwide study 
of CompStat’s effectiveness on crime, this report finds that the introduction of a CompStat-style 
program may be responsible for a 5 to 15 percent decrease in crime across cities that introduced 
it. CompStat is a police management technique — a way to run police departments — that was 
widely deployed in the nation’s cities in the 1990s and 2000s, starting in New York City in 1994. 
Specifically, a CompStat-style program is associated with a 13 percent decrease in violent crime, 
an 11 percent decrease in property crime, and a 13 percent decrease in homicide. The effect of a 
CompStat-style program on crime in a specific city can vary above or below these national averages. 
Part II, which delves into the effect of policing on crime, presents this report’s 14th theory. Because policing 
is largely a local function, executed on the city and county level, an empirical analysis of its effect on crime 
must be conducted at a local level and could not be incorporated into the state-level analysis in Part I.
A. POLICING
Although the effect of police on crime is a popular topic, there has been much conflation of the ways 
in which police affect crime. There are two distinct aspects of policing: numbers of police and how 
police fight crime. As noted in Part I, there is some research indicating that numbers of police can 
reduce crime. However, is there evidence that specific policing systems, strategies, or tactics aimed at 
combating crime actually reduce crime? There is little national-level analysis on this question. This 
report therefore seeks to fill a gap in the research. 
Police aim to both prevent and respond to crime, including through enforcing criminal laws. Police are 
often the most visible element of crime-control policy and are usually citizens’ first contact with the 
criminal justice system. Officers may deter crime by their mere presence. They make the first determination 
of whether to pull an individual into the criminal justice system. Arrests and searches serve as first contacts 
that can eventually lead to pre-trial detention, prison, or other forms of punishment. Enforcement can also 
serve as a deterrent to future crime. Policing tactics can affect both the crime rate and the incarceration rate.
It is difficult to measure how different police departments deploy tactics, such as “broken windows 
policing” (where police focus on low-level crimes such as breaking windows and graffiti on the theory 
that such enforcement will stop more serious crime), “hot spots policing” (where police focus resources 
in areas where crime is most likely to occur), or “stop-and-frisk” (when officers stop individuals, who 
may not be overtly engaged in criminal activity, and conduct a pat-down).273 There is great variance from 
city to city and each department defines these types of tactics in different ways. One way to examine the 
overall national effect of any of these types of policing would be an extensive survey of individual police 
departments including an interview process. Even then, such qualitative data faces criticisms of subjectivity 
and the pitfalls associated with different definitions and implementation techniques across departments.
II.
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Based on the authors’ research, CompStat, however, emerged as one of the most consistent, easily 
identifiable, and widespread policing techniques. CompStat was widely introduced in the nation’s cities in 
the 1990s and 2000s. Although different departments implement the management technique in different 
ways, the general objective is the same: to implement strong management and accountability within 
police departments to execute strategies based on robust data collection, to reduce and prevent crime. 
CompStat also tends to have a clear date of introduction in a city, which allows for input of that data 
into an empirical analysis. Regional differences could change CompStat’s effect on reducing crime from 
locality to locality, yet a national effect can still be quantified by aggregating and analyzing cross-city data. 
For the purposes of this report, CompStat represents a 14th theory on the crime decline — a way to 
analyze a national effect on crime of one strategy that police ostensibly use to fight crime. Part II of 
this report presents a city-level analysis of CompStat by examining its use in the 50 most populous 
U.S. cities. Part II first explains CompStat and then discusses past research on policing tactics. Finally, 
it presents the first nationwide analysis of the effect of CompStat implementation on crime reduction.
1. Introduction of CompStat
a. What is CompStat?
CompStat stands for COMParative STATistics.274 Police Commissioner William Bratton first introduced 
it in New York City in 1994.275 
Essentially, a CompStat program requires police to use technology and data analysis to gather timely, accurate 
information about crime patterns and then respond quickly to break those patterns. Although many police 
departments custom-tailored CompStat to their own departmental and neighborhood needs, the widely 
consistent elements of CompStat are its strong management and accountability techniques, as well as 
its reliance on data collection to inform the choice of crime control tactics deployed to neighborhoods. 
These aspects play out at regularly occurring meetings, usually every week, in which department executives, 
detectives, and officers discuss and analyze crime data and strategize tactics aimed at areas of concentrated 
crime. There is also rigorous follow-up to ensure these tactics are deployed and were effective to ensure their 
goals. CompStat bridges the divide between policing theories and concrete police tactics, putting policing 
theory into practice.
In the years after its introduction in New York City, the city experienced a dramatic drop in crime, 
which inspired other police departments to implement the program or similar programs. The Police 
Executive Research Forum (PERF) found that 79 percent of medium to large police departments 
surveyed use some form of CompStat, though often termed a different technical name.276 
As described by Jack Maple, a former Lieutenant in the New York City Transit Police, who worked with 
Commissioner Bratton to deploy CompStat, there are four basic principles of CompStat:277
• Accurate, Timely Intelligence: Information, data, and regional analysis drive the CompStat
process. Specifically, statistical analysis digests raw data to assist commanders in making
policing decisions. Geographic analysis helps commanders locate crime and target those areas
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for increased police presence. This enables police departments to make informed and rapid 
decisions about how to respond to crime and where to focus resources.
• Effective Tactics: Commanders use this data to understand fluctuations of crime in their
jurisdictions and then develop plans to address crime. Commanders strategically direct 
resources at all parts of a problem, including past police resources as well as resources from 
community, local, state, and federal agencies. 
• Rapid Deployment: Armed with timely data, analysis, and a targeted policing plan, commanders
carry out the plan to quell crime in their jurisdiction. This differs from how many police 
departments operated in the past, when they primarily addressed crime after the fact. CompStat 
increases a police department’s capability to address crime proactively, deploying resources 
faster and often before more crime occurs.
• Relentless Follow-up and Assessment: A strong results-oriented management is likely the most
critical aspect of CompStat. CompStat focuses a department’s resources on the overall goal of 
crime reduction and holds departments, commanders, and officers accountable to achieving that 
goal. Police departments assess whether the tactics they deployed were successful after each plan is 
implemented. Commanders adjust the plan if the results indicate the strategy was not successful.278 
Above all, CompStat is a police management technique — a way to run police departments. 
Programs vary among cities because police departments adapt CompStat to fit their own budget, 
organizational structure and culture, and local needs. A 2013 report by the Bureau of Justice Assistance 
(BJA) and PERF studied the evolution of CompStat and how it is deployed in different cities.279 
The report found some variations, which include:
• Tactics Deployed in Identified Areas: Once CompStat helps identify a high crime area, police
departments can vary widely in which tactics officers employ once they arrive in target locations.
BJA and PERF found departments may foster internal collaboration between commanders,
engage with the community to prevent crime and disorder, or simply increase visibility.280 These
can take the form of specific policing tactics such as hot spots, broken windows, or “community
policing” (in which police work in tandem with the community to prevent and solve crimes).
Notably, this Brennan Center report does not produce findings or opine on the specific policing
strategies that police departments employ in neighborhoods after the use of CompStat to identify
target areas. Rather, it focuses on whether a department utilizes CompStat at all.
• Depth of Integration of CompStat into Policing Culture and Strategy: Police departments differ
in leadership, size, location, and resources, and operate under varying political pressures. This
creates variations in how deeply a police department embeds the core tenets of CompStat in its
culture and tactics. Departments may deploy CompStat more or less vigorously depending on
past mechanisms, bureaucratic systems, and internal resources.281 For example, New York City
implemented CompStat rigorously by deploying a system of accountability and coordination
that connected each precinct, borough, and beat cop.282 Some departments, however, lack the
infrastructure to support the core tenets of a CompStat program. For example, the program
in Lowell, Mass., “was subject to internal conflicts that made it deviate from New York’s
prototype. Scarce resources and a veiled sense of competition made commanders reluctant to
share resources with sectors that were hardest hit by crime.”283 In Chicago, Police Superintendent
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Garry McCarthy utilizes CompStat to target gang related violence. His strategy relies on “gang 
audits” that provide updated information on activity of the city’s almost 600 gang groups. After a 
shooting occurs, commanders in the city’s 22 police districts receive intelligence information on 
the gangs involved and marshal resources to prevent violent retaliation.284
• Reliability of Data: Some have noted that the accountability and data-collection pressures associated
with CompStat can sometimes lead to data manipulation or quotas.285 Specifically, a criticism of 
CompStat is that it has incentivized “a numbers game.”286 There is evidence that some departments 
have responded to CompStat’s increased accountability measures by misreporting crime statistics to 
provide the impression of decreased crime. In a 2010 survey of retired NYPD officers, criminologists 
John Eterno and Eli Silverman found that more than half of those responding admitted to “fudging 
numbers,” thereby misrepresenting crime data in relation to their police work.287 Police leadership 
has noted the inappropriateness of falsifying data. For example, in response to allegations, Los 
Angeles Police Department CompStat Unit Officer Jeff Godown has stated that “[m]anipulating 
crime statistics to reflect more favorably on the crime rate is on its face inappropriate, ethically 
wrong, and if allowed to be practiced, will erode the credibility of the Department.”288 
Recognizing there is inconsistency among police departments, this report is able to shed light on CompStat’s 
national effectiveness on crime control by observing trends across multiple cities and multiple years. 
Despite individual differences, another reason to look at CompStat is that its widespread use coincides 
with crime reduction this century. By 2006, about half of the 50 most populous cities in the U.S. 
were using some form of CompStat. By 2014, the number had grown to 43. (Figure 28 depicts only 
41 cities because it is unclear exactly when Jacksonville, Fla. and Miami, Fla. implemented some form 
of CompStat. In three cities (Indianapolis, Ind., Albuquerque, N.M., and Colorado Springs, Colo.), 
CompStat was implemented and then removed before 2014.) 
Figure 28: 50 Most Populous U.S. Cities with CompStat (1994-2014)
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b. Past Research 
There has been little empirical work on whether specific police tactics have decreased crime, particularly 
as nationally applied. 
In the early 1990s, many crime theorists commonly believed that policing did not work to prevent or 
manage crime. In 1990, sociologists Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi wrote that no evidence 
exists that the “augmentation of patrol forces or equipment, differential patrol strategies, or differential 
intensities of surveillance have an effect on crime rates.”290 A few years later, in 1994, criminologist David 
Bayley wrote in his book, Police for the Future: “Police do not prevent crime. This is one of the best kept 
secrets of modern life. Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it.”291 Levitt’s 
2004 study was also skeptical of the effectiveness of police tactics in reducing crime, though he argued 
police numbers might affect crime.292
Recent research, however, has found that policing tactics can indeed be effective at reducing crime. One 
contribution to this change may be a change in policing strategies themselves. A new wave of policing 
strategies, grounded in data and new research, has been implemented by several police departments 
in recent decades. This body of research is largely experimental and focused on specific localities. The 
discussion below presents examples of research on the effectiveness of three specific policing strategies: 
“hot spots policing,” community policing, and the use of CompStat. 
The tactic known as hot spots policing deploys law enforcement resources to areas where crime is 
most likely to occur.293 In 1995, criminologists Lawrence Sherman and David Weisburd conducted a 
randomized experiment and found that hot spots policing was correlated with a 6 to 13 percent drop 
in 911 calls reporting crimes in Minneapolis, Minnesota.294 In 2004, a Committee to Review Research 
on Police Policy recommended “that the National Institute of Justice support a program of rigorous 
evaluation of new crime information technologies in local police agencies.”295 Criminologist Anthony 
Braga’s 2007 analysis of various experimental studies found that hot spots policing modestly affected 
crime in cities, including Kansas City, Mo. and Minneapolis, Minn.296 In 2008, Braga reviewed nine hot 
spots policing experimental evaluations and found that seven (Minneapolis, Minn., Jersey City, N.J., St. 
Louis, Mo, Kansas City, Mo., and Houston, Tex.) showed evidence of “significant” reductions in crime.297 
Researchers have also studied community policing’s effectiveness on crime. In this approach, law 
enforcement works together with members of the community — individuals as well as businesses, 
nonprofits, and other government agencies — toward its goals. It employs “problem-solving” techniques 
to “proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social 
disorder, and fear of crime.”298 Techniques can vary from hosting community meetings to implementing 
foot patrols or neighborhood watch programs.299 In community policing, law enforcement partners 
with the community to address crime problems and deploys problem-solving techniques to address the 
underlying conditions that produce public safety issues.
In 2004, two studies, one from Sherman and Eck and one from the NAS, did not find strong evidence that 
community policing reduced crime.300 However, the NAS report noted that community policing programs 
that employed door-to-door home visits by officers reduced levels of crime victimization in those areas.301 
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Other studies that examined components of community policing have found success in reduction of crime 
and fear of crime. For example, in 2010, Charis Kubrin and her coauthors defined “proactive policing,” as an 
essential component of community policing, and studied its effect of on robbery in 181 large U.S. cities.302 
Proactive policing aims to deter crime through police presence and engaging the public.303 
Research on the effectiveness of CompStat style programs on crime is scarce. The few empirical studies 
that examine CompStat consider its effect on reducing crime in specific cities. Much research has 
focused on New York City. In the 2011 book The City That Became Safe, Frank Zimring gave CompStat 
much credit for New York City’s crime drop. Zimring, as noted in the box on “CompStat in New York 
City,” concluded that CompStat’s accountability and management techniques allowed New York City’s 
crime to drop. However, in a 2014 study, sociologist David Greenberg argued that CompStat did not 
play a role in New York City’s crime drop in the 1990s. Greenberg graphed crime trends over time, both 
before and after CompStat’s introduction, and observed no marked change in crime trends.304 Similarly, 
in 2005, Rosenfeld found no effect of CompStat on homicide rates in New York City.305 
Criminologists Hyunseok Jang, Larry Hoover, and Hee-Jong Joo studied CompStat in Fort Worth, Texas 
in 2010, and found that “[a]t least 90% of the [CompStat] interventions involved target enforcement — 
specific offenses, at specific times, at specific locations, committed by specific offenders,” and resulted in 
a significant decrease in property crime.306 Criminologist Lorraine Mazerolle and her coauthors studied 
a CompStat-style program in Queensland, Australia. They found that crime was 25 percent lower than 
expected without the program and found a reduction of 3,200 crimes, especially unlawful entries.307 
These past studies offer a glimpse into how CompStat could affect crime in specific cities, yet their 
findings are limited and cannot necessarily be applied to the national level.
Other research on CompStat-style programs has focused on observing how it spread as a national 
trend.308 Weisburd, along with others, has studied the organizational change created by implementation 
of CompStat in police departments.309 A 2013 report from the U.S. Department of Justice and PERF 
describing the evolution of CompStat advocated for its continued adoption based largely on the 
positive experiences of police as reported in survey data.310 An article published by the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police stated that CompStat is associated with “the positive outcome of 
recurring incremental reductions in crime.”311 
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CompStat in New York City
Nowhere is the effect of CompStat on crime more frequently discussed than in New York City. 
The late Jack Maple, then a lieutenant in the New York City Transit Police, first implemented the 
initial principles behind CompStat in the late 1980s. Maple tracked crimes on 55 feet of maps 
taped to a wall and called them “Charts of the Future.” He used the charts to deploy transit police 
to target areas, and root out crime patterns in the subways. Within a few years, gang robberies on 
the subways fell from 1,200 per year to 12.312
When William Bratton became former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani’s first Police Commissioner, he 
appointed Maple Deputy Commissioner. The two set out to disprove the notion that the police have 
little control over crime and disorder. In 1994, they created and implemented CompStat with the 
goal of reducing crime by 10 percent in its first year. Crime dropped 12 percent in that first year.313 
The NYPD created specific plans advancing key objectives: removing guns from New York City’s 
streets, reclaiming public spaces, reducing youth violence, curbing drug dealing, and breaking the 
cycle of domestic violence. Each goal contained specific, measurable targets. Bratton followed the 
directives of management experts and used what some have referred to as a “textbook” approach to 
reorganize the department.314 
New York’s version of CompStat was influential nationally. Some describe the post-CompStat 
NYPD as “a decentralized organization granting significant autonomy to local commands while 
maintaining vigorous strategic guidance from the top.”315 A study by the Police Foundation found 
that an overwhelming number of police departments that observed a CompStat meeting or 
department did so at the NYPD.316 New York’s experience resulted in policies and practices that 
embedded CompStat into the fabric of police management. 
Some researchers credit much of the crime decline in New York to CompStat. They reason that 
CompStat’s tactical planning and accountability system established a uniform vision, shared from 
police executives down to line officers, on how to best combat crime. They also point to the steeper 
drop in crime in New York compared to the national average. Between 1994 and 2012, there was 
a 63 percent decrease in crime reported to the police in New York City. Nationwide reported crime 
fell 27.2 percent during the same period.317 Zimring posited that no other explanation exists for the 
city’s remarkable drop in crime. His research notes that after changes in policing tactics in the 1990s 
“CompStat information and planning systems pervade all of the strategic changes in the NYPD,” and 
are now “an indivisible part of everything the department does.”318 Zimring argues that CompStat’s 
transforming effect created a “centralized and top down” management structure, “to create a more 
direct linkage from the top command down.”319 As one example of a shift, he points to how, 
under CompStat, officers could identify when and where crimes were occurring and together with 
“[n]ew levels of manpower [that] came into the department with new levels of aggressiveness and new 
enforcement priorities…the new information and management systems coordinated these efforts.”320 
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Other researchers and academics doubt the direct correlation between New York City’s 
implementation of CompStat and the crime decline. As stated previously, Greenberg’s 2013 analysis 
argued that violent and property crime did not significantly decrease after the implementation of 
CompStat. Both types of crime continued on a consistent downward slope in the city beginning in 
the early 1990s — before CompStat’s implementation.321 
Some have argued that CompStat has been associated with the practice of stop-and-frisk.322 For 
example, some NYPD officers report they were pressured to meet quotas that could have been 
correlated back to CompStat programs.323 However, as New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio recently 
noted, CompStat could be used to counter the overuse of stop-and-frisk. The Mayor recently stated 
that CompStat meetings are an opportunity to routinely challenge commanding officers regarding 
the high number of stops in specific precincts.324 Since Commissioner Bratton’s return to the 
NYPD in 2014, the use of stop-and-frisk in New York City has been declining while the City also 
continued to see crime decline.325 Bratton has encouraged the NYPD to embrace the new model 
of “predictive policing,” which uses data streams to anticipate crime patterns and allocate police 
resources. In 2014, he implemented a policy to issue a summons for marijuana possession below 25 
grams, in lieu of arrest.326 The department also aims to improve the public’s confidence in police. It 
will start by regularly conducting a survey of residents to ask about perceptions of police.327 In the 
aftermath of the death of Eric Garner and the national debate on police practices, the NYPD may 
also undertake additional changes to improve police community relations. 
Because of its unique and original application, the New York City experience with CompStat may 
be an outlier.328 It is especially difficult to compare New York City’s use of CompStat with that of 
other jurisdictions because the NYPD is the nation’s largest, and one of the most well-funded and 
visible, police departments.329 Because of these differences, New York City’s use of CompStat could 
have affected crime differently than the national average quantified in this report’s findings. 
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c.	 New	Empirical	Analysis:	National	Effect	of	CompStat	on	Crime
This report undertakes the first national city-level empirical analysis of the effect of CompStat on 
reducing crime. 
This report’s analysis examines monthly crime rate data at the city-level for the 50 most populous cities 
where CompStat was implemented in the U.S. from 1990 to 2012.330 Monthly city-level crime data 
were unavailable for 2013 at time of publication of this report and therefore could not be included.
To identify when and where CompStat was implemented, the authors conducted extensive research 
to determine whether cities self-identified as using CompStat or a comparable program. The authors 
then verified the information with national police leaders listed as Expert Reviewers, as well as through 
phone calls to each police department. 
Table 6 also provides data on crime the year before and after the introduction of the CompStat program. 
Clearly, CompStat was not the only factor affecting the crime decline during these years, but these data 
provide one point of reference. In sum:
•	 42 cities were included in the regression:
o 39 cities implemented CompStat.
o Three cities did not implement CompStat. Notably, two cities (Seattle, Wash. and Detroit, 
Mich.) introduced CompStat after 2012 and are therefore included as not using CompStat 
during the regression period as it only runs through 2012.
•	 Eight cities were not included because certain elements needed to be included in a monthly 
regression from 1980 to 2012 were absent:
o In five cities, (El Paso, Tex., Sacramento, Calif., San Jose, Calif., Jacksonville, Fl., and 
Miami, Fl.), CompStat was implemented but the authors were unable to identify an exact 
month of implementation. 
o In two cities (Indianapolis, Ind. and Albuquerque, N.M.), police departments implemented 
and then terminated a CompStat program within a few years, and the termination month 
was unknown. 
o In one city (Long Beach, Calif.) there was conflicting evidence as to whether a CompStat 
program was in place. 
74  |  BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE
Table 6: Crime and CompStat in the 50 Most Populous Cities 
City Name Date Introduced
Percent 
Change in 
Crime 
Year Before
Percent 
Change in 
Crime 
Year After
New York, N.Y.331 CompStat 04/1994 -18% -7%
Indianapolis, Ind.332* IMAP 1996-Early 2000s n/a n/a
Memphis, Tenn. 333 CompStat 09/1997 -12% -11%
El Paso, Tex.334* SAC 1997 n/a n/a
Arlington, Tex.335 CompStat 11/1997 1% -7%
Las Vegas, Nev.336 CompStat 11/1997 2% -13%
Minneapolis, Minn.337 CODEFOR 01/1998 n/a n/a
Louisville, Ky.,338 CompStat 03/1998 -5% -23%
Philadelphia, Pa.339 CompStat 03/1998 14% 8%
San Diego, Calif.340 ARJIS 04/1999 -11% -19%
Sacramento, Calif.341* CompStat 1998 or 1999 n/a n/a
Albuquerque, N.M.342* CompStat Early 2000s-2005 n/a n/a
Baltimore, Md.343 CitiStat 06/2000 n/a 8%
Raleigh, N.C.344 CompStat 09/2001 -5% 1%
Tucson, Ariz.345 TOP 05/2002 -10% 7%
Oklahoma City, Okla.346 Comstat 07/2002 14% -6%
Atlanta, Ga.347 COBRA 07/2002 -7% -12%
Fort Worth, Tex.348 CompStat 09/2002 16% -15%
Los Angeles, Calif.349 CompStat 10/2002 -3% -5%
Omaha, Neb.350 CompStat 07/2003 -8% -7%
San Jose, Calif.351* RCITI 2004 n/a n/a
Nashville, Tenn.352 CompStat 03/2004 -4% 5%
Portland, Ore.353 Comstat 03/2004 -8% 5%
Virginia Beach, Va.354 CompStat 07/2004 -1% 1%
Dallas, Tex.355 CompStat 09/2004 -1% -10%
Kansas City, Mo.356 CSTAR 03/2005 -4% -10%
Cleveland, Ohio357 CrimeView 10/2005 5% 4%
Columbus, Ohio358 ColumbusStat 01/2006 4% -1%
Denver, Colo.359 Core 02/2006 -27% -12%
Fresno, Calif.360 Crime View 05/2006 -10% -14%
Mesa, Ariz.361 CompStat 08/2006 -18% 6%
Washington, DC362 CapStat 01/2007 27% -4%
Boston, Mass.363 CompStat 02/2007 -10% -7%
Austin, Tex.364 CompStat 03/2008 -7% 23%
Charlotte, N.C.365 CompStat 04/2008 5% -22%
Milwaukee, Wis.366 CompStat 07/2008 -3% -8%
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City Name Date Introduced
Percent 
Change in 
Crime 
Year Before
Percent 
Change in 
Crime 
Year After
Oakland, Calif.367 CompStat 01/2009 36% -4%
Tulsa, Okla.368 CompStat 03/2009 3% -9%
San Francisco, Calif.369 CompStat 10/2009 -3% -23%
Colorado Springs, Colo.370 CompStat 12/2010-12/2011 n/a n/a
Chicago, Ill.371 CompStat 07/2011 -20% -19%
San Antonio, Tex.372 StrIDE 10/2011 -19% -3%
Detroit, Mich.373± CompStat 2013 n/a n/a
Seattle, Wash.374± SeaStat 2014 n/a n/a
Jacksonville, Fla.375* CRIMES Unknown n/a n/a
Miami, Fla.376* CompStat Unknown n/a n/a
Wichita, Kan.377± No CompStat None n/a n/a
Houston, Tex.378± No CompStat None n/a n/a
Phoenix, Ariz.379± No CompStat None n/a n/a
Long Beach, Calif.380* Unclear Whether 
CompStat
None n/a n/a
Source: Brennan Center research; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Rate Reports.381 
* Cities not included in the regression. See text for explanation.
ǂ Cities included in the regression as not employing CompStat. 
The authors ran a city-level regression comparing the effect of the introduction of CompStat with the 
crime rate in these cities as noted in the UCR. The regression includes the number of police officers in 
each city, but does not isolate the effect of numbers of police on the crime drop.382 Isolating the effect 
of number of police versus policing strategies is a fruitful avenue for future research. Additionally, there 
are other factors that could influence CompStat’s effect on crime, including changes in police budgets 
or police leadership. Research on the effect of CompStat would benefit from further exploration of 
these variables and others. Nevertheless, this report’s findings are useful because they shed light on the 
national effect of CompStat-style programs on crime. 
This report finds that the introduction of CompStat-style programs is responsible for a 5 to 15 percent 
decrease in crime in cities where the programs were implemented. Specifically, the results indicate 
that the introduction of CompStat-style programs is associated with a 13 percent decrease in violent 
crime, an 11 percent decrease in property crime, and a 13 percent decrease in homicide. The result 
for property crime is strongly statistically significant. The results suggest that the implementation of 
CompStat-style programs may have an effect on homicide and violent crime. This national effect is seen 
by aggregating and analyzing this cross-city, multi-year data. 
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d. CompStat	and	Crime	in	Specific	Cities
Because this report aggregates effects across cities to produce a national finding, it does not provide 
granular findings on CompStat’s effectiveness on reducing crime in any specific city. However, crime 
rate trends in specific cities before and after the introduction of CompStat, as shown in Figure 29, can 
serve as a helpful point of comparison. Undoubtedly, CompStat-style programs were not responsible 
for the entire crime drop in these cities. Several variables, including those described in Part I, played 
a role in each city’s crime drop. Because the implementation of CompStat varies from city to city, 
CompStat’s effect on crime in each city will vary somewhat from the national finding.
Figure 29: Crime Rates Before and After CompStat (1990 to 2012)
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New York City
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Note: In 2002, New York City changed its crime statistic reporting from monthly to quarterly.
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Source: FBI Uniform Crime Reports and Brennan Center research.383
Figure 29 reveals the following trends: 
• Dallas: Crime dropped quickly after the introduction of CompStat in 2004. Through 2012,
the city experienced a 43 percent drop in crime.
• Los Angeles: The number of police officers remained relatively constant from 1990 to 2012.
After CompStat was introduced in 2002, property crime, which had been trending upward,
began to decline. Violent crime fell throughout the two decades. Through 2012, crime dropped
63 percent overall in Los Angeles.
• New York City: The crime rate was falling even before CompStat’s implementation in 1994.
That trend accelerated after 1994. Through 2012, crime dropped 63 percent in New York City.
• Philadelphia: Although the number of police officers grew slightly before CompStat’s
introduction in March 1998, the number of police has remained relatively steady since.
Property crime, which spiked immediately after CompStat was deployed, has since followed a
downward trend. Overall, crime dropped 29 percent in Philadelphia through 2012. Property
crime in particular dropped 32 percent during this period.
Though these results vary in degree, the introduction of CompStat in these cities seems to be associated 
with a subsequent reduction in crime. 
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CONCLUSION 
Public and political pressure to effectively fight crime and improve public safety has been used to justify 
mass incarceration despite the economic, human, and moral toll. However, as this report finds, during 
the past two decades the approach of using incarceration as a one-size fits all punishment for crime has 
passed the point of diminishing returns to actually reduce crime.
This report demonstrates that when other variables are controlled for, increasing incarceration had a 
minimal effect on reducing property crime in the 1990s and no effect on violent crime. In the 2000s, 
increased incarceration had no effect on violent crime and accounted for less than one-hundredth of 
the decade’s property crime drop.
This report also finds that one police management technique, CompStat, had a modest effect on 
reducing crime. 
The criminal justice policies of the last half century have played a crucial role in feeding the explosion in 
incarceration as a primary method to combat crime. However, the findings in this report call lawmakers 
to seize the current moment for change. In a time of shrinking state and local budgets, policymakers 
and law enforcement officials are rethinking policies that overburden our justice system. And there are 
shifts elsewhere — federal lawmakers are rethinking major criminal justice policies. The path forward 
lies with retooling our laws and practices to advance the twin goals of keeping the public safe while 
retreating from mass incarceration. 
In times of shrinking budgets or economic prosperity, the government should be in the business of 
investing in and deploying policies that achieve their intended goals. This report offers lasting support 
that there is a continued need to rethink policies that are bad investments: costly, harmful to society, 
and now proven to have diminishing effectiveness to control crime.
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APPENDIX A: STATE-SPECIFIC GRAPHS ON INCARCERATION & CRIME
The state specific graphs presented below provide a deeper look at how incarceration and crime play out 
in states. Part I of this report contains the graphs for 11 states: California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, 
Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. Graphs for the remainder 
of states are below.
The graphs provide an approximation of the effectiveness of incarceration at reducing crime in each 
state. They apply this report’s national findings from the state-level panel to each state’s incarceration 
and crime rates. Specifically, the authors calculated the changes in state imprisonment and crime using 
UCR and BJS data, and the elasticity estimate from this report’s regression analysis.384 The authors found 
the percent change in state imprisonment and multiplied it by the elasticity estimate to get the estimate 
for the percent change in crime. Then the authors divided the estimated percent change in crime by the 
real change in crime to get the percent of the crime decline attributable to state imprisonment. 
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APPENDIX B: EXPANDED METHODOLOGY, DATA SOURCES & RESULTS TABLES
Appendix B provides the data sources and regression analysis explanation for the state-level analysis in 
Part I and the city-level analysis in Part II. It discusses the data used and the regression used for each 
Part. 
I. STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS
This section explains the methodology for Part I of the report. 
The regressions were run using the software program Stata, using a population averaged panel data 
regression with fixed effects. The data structure for the state-level analysis is a panel dataset. Panel data 
are comprised of repeated observations (one per year, in this case) for a set of entities (the 50 states and 
D.C.). The panel data structure is desirable because it allows us to observe variation over time (from 
1980 to 2013) and across states. The state-level dataset contains over 1,600 yearly observations over 34 
years (1980-2013) for a wide range of crime-relevant variables. In total, the dataset has over 115,000 
entries. The analysis examined the effects of these variables on the crime decline as a whole, as well 
as on violent crime and property crime specifically. Variables related to criminal justice policy (e.g. 
incarceration, police numbers, executions) were lagged one year as noted below. (Lagging allows us to 
consider the effect of a variable in year zero on crime in year one. For example, it would allow us to see 
the effect of increased police officers in 1979 on crime in 1980. This helps mitigate any “simultaneity 
effect.” For example, it would help us isolate the effect of increased police officers on crime from the 
effect of crime on increased police officers.) Although the regression analysis includes the 1980s, the 
discussion in this report considers only the 1990s and 2000s decades. It also separated out effects by 
decade: 1990 to 1999 (“the 1990s”) and 2000 to 2013 (“the 2000s”) to expose more nuanced effects 
given the different demographic, economic, and policy trends in each decade. 
The authors set out to examine the effect of the most popular theories on the crime decline. Thirteen 
were identified: incarceration, police numbers, use of capital punishment, decline of crack use, right-
to-carry gun laws, unemployment, income, inflation, consumer confidence, legalization of abortion, 
decreased lead in gasoline, alcohol consumption, and the aging population. However, as noted below, 
data in the form needed to be included in the regression (state-by-state for all the years from 1980 
to 2013) could not be secured for all the variables. Therefore, the state-panel regression included the 
following variables: lagged log of incarceration (yearend jurisdictional imprisonment population per 
capita), lagged log of incarceration squared, lagged executions, lagged log of police employment per 
capita, percent unemployment, median income, beer consumption per capita, right-to-carry law, 
percent of the population that was black, age distribution (percent of that population that was aged 
15-19, 20-24, and 25-30), and state and year “fixed effects” (which account for extraneous factors). 
As noted below, data were collected from a wide variety of sources. Most of the sources were federal 
government departments’ websites. 
This section explains the caveats present for each variable and data source.
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A. Data Sources
Data on Crime
The crime data can be included as total crime, violent crime, property crime, or any specific crime 
reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR), such as homicide or burglary. 
This report uses crime data from the UCR and primarily considers the overall crime rate, as well as 
homicide, violent crime, and property crime rates.385 The UCR was established in 1929 and collects 
information on the number of reported crimes from state and local law authorities to construct a count 
of crime nationwide. It is the main source for nationwide crime statistics. The UCR’s two primary 
measures of crime are calculated from seven Part I offenses in two categories — “violent crime” and 
“property crime.” Primary data at both city and state levels was used to analyze the effect on crime, as 
recorded by the UCR. 
The UCR’s violent crime definition includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, 
robbery, and aggravated assault.386 These crimes are defined as: 
•	 Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter. Includes murder and non-negligent manslaughter. It 
does not include traffic fatalities or justifiable homicides, which are defined as “(1) the killing 
of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty; or (2) the killing of a felon, during 
the commission of a felony, by a private citizen.”
•	 Forcible Rape. Until 2013, forcible rape was defined as “the carnal knowledge of a female 
forcibly and against her will.” The revised definition now redirects the focus to consent and 
includes assaults on men and transgender individuals, defining rape as “[p]enetration, no 
matter how slight, of the vagina or anus with any body part or object, or oral penetration by a 
sex organ of another person, without the consent of the victim.” Statutory rape is not included.
•	 Robbery. “The taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or 
control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the 
victim in fear.” 
•	 Aggravated assault. An “unlawful attack by one person upon another for the purpose of inflicting 
severe or aggravated bodily injury…(and) usually is accompanied by the use of a weapon or by 
means likely to produce death or great bodily harm.” 
The UCR’s property crimes include burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. These crimes are 
defined as:
•	 Burglary. Defined as breaking or entering: the unlawful entry (or attempt to forcibly enter) a 
structure “to commit a felony or a theft.”
•	 Larceny-theft. The unlawful attempt (successful or not) to take, carry, lead, or ride away of property 
from the “possession or constructive possession” of another, such as bicycle thefts, shoplifting, 
pickpocketing, anything not taken by force, violence, fraud, embezzlement, or forgery.
•	 Motor vehicle theft. The theft or attempted theft of a motor vehicle, defined as self-propelled 
and runs on land surface and not on rails. 
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This report, therefore, does not consider rates of various other crimes, such as drug use offenses or 
white-collar crimes. 
As with any data collection system, there are recognized shortcomings of the UCR. For instance, the 
UCR relies on police departments to self-report their crime statistics monthly.387 Rape, for example, is 
highly underreported in the UCR because it depends in part on victims to report the crime’s occurrence. 
Other crimes are also underreported and therefore underrepresented in UCR statistics. The definitions 
in the UCR can also create under-collection of crime data. The previous federal definition of rape might 
also have caused the crime to be underreported as it narrows the instances that are classified as rape.388 
The UCR also does not include crimes reported to the federal government, immigration offenses, 
crimes committed in prisons on prisoners, or killings by police officers.389 Some have also argued that 
law enforcement can manipulate UCR statistics.390 
The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), started in 1973, is an alternative form of crime data 
that can be useful, specifically for research about sexual assault, because it takes information directly 
from constituents and can capture more than just what was reported to the police.391 The NCVS 
collects information on the number of crimes by surveying households, thereby indirectly estimating 
crime occurrence. It collects information on slightly different categories of crime than the UCR (for 
example, the NCVS does not collect data on homicide). Although the NCVS may be more effective in 
capturing crimes less likely to be reported to police, it too suffers from accuracy challenges as it is based 
on a survey of a sample of households. 
NCVS is national survey and does not include state-by-state data. It therefore could not be included 
in the authors’ state-by-state regression. Further, because the UCR is the current best cited source of 
national crime statistics — as well as the source on which the crime decline is based — the authors used 
the UCR data, recognizing that it does not perfectly capture crime. 
Data on Incarceration
The data for incarceration is based on the yearend state jurisdictional imprisonment population per 
capita collected from the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) via the National 
Prisoner Statistics reports.392 Data for yearend jurisdictional population per state resident population 
was included from 1980 to 2013 and lagged one year in the regression analysis. That is, the regression 
examines incarceration in one year and the crime rate the following year. This also helps mitigate 
any “simultaneity effect” — meaning it helps isolate the effect of incarceration on crime from the 
effect of crime on incarceration. This data set includes all adult state prisoners held in public or private 
prisons and jails (some state prisoners are held in local jails). It does not include the general pretrial jail 
population, federal population, juvenile population, or people in immigration detention. Notable, data 
for imprisonment in the District of Columbia was not available after 2000, when BJS began classifying 
D.C. prisoners as federal prisoners.393 
Other sources of federal prison and local jail were not available in the format needed for a state level 
regression including data on all years from 1980 to 2013. Federal prisoners can be held in facilities 
in states different from the ones in which they were convicted; yearly state-by-state data on federal 
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prisoners from 1980 to 2013 broken down by state of origin of prisoners is not available.394 Local 
jail data are not available on a state-by-state basis for all the years either. The Annual Survey of Jails 
(ASJ) conducted by BJS collects data from a nationally representative sample of local jails, but does 
not include data for 1983, 1988, 1993, 1999, or 2005. Further, the ASJ is a sample survey and is not 
comprehensive for all states. The Census of Jails conducted by BJS was conducted only in 1972, 1978, 
1983, 1988, 1993, 1999, 2002, 2005, and 2006.395
For that reason, the authors used state imprisonment data (the number of state prisoners incarcerated in 
public or private state prisons or local jails) as a proxy for the incarceration variable.396 As noted in Part 
I, the use of this data set is in line with other empirical analyses of the effect of incarceration on crime. 
The exclusion of federal, jail, and juvenile data does not affect the core findings of this report. If those 
data were included, the rate of incarceration would be even higher than that in the authors’ regression. 
A higher incarceration rate would show more dramatic diminishing returns on crime reduction. For 
this reason, the empirical findings of this report are in fact conservative compared to what accounting 
for all types of incarceration would produce. 
Data on Number of Police Officers
Data on police officer employment were collected from the Justice Expenditure and Employment Series 
from BJS and the UCR.397 The data include the number of sworn officers per resident population for 
the 50 states and the District of Columbia. It does not include civilian employees of police departments. 
The UCR contains the number of sworn officers until 2006. Data for sworn officers from 2006 to 2013 
were then collected from the Justice Expenditure and Employment Series.
The data spanned from 1980 to 2013 and was lagged one year in the regression analysis. That is, the 
regression examines number of sworn officers in one year and the crime rate the following year. This is 
to mitigate any “simultaneity effect” — meaning it helps isolate the effect of police numbers on crime 
from the effect of crime on police numbers (in response to crime police departments usually hire more 
officers). Data for 1991 were unavailable; therefore, the means of the data for 1990 and 1992 were 
used as a proxy for 1991. Data for 1987, 1988, and 1989 was also unavailable; therefore the weighted 
averages of data for 1986 and 1990 were used for those years. 
Looking at all sworn officers may not fully capture police presence in a neighborhood. The data set 
does not differentiate between sworn officers working the beat and those with administrative positions. 
Sworn officers could also work in administration, investigations, technical support, jail operations, 
or court operations.398 Therefore, the data does not necessarily capture changes in police presence if 
positions shift but the number of sworn officers does not change. It also does not capture whether 
police presence is concentrated within states or localities. 
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Data on Use of Death Penalty
Data on the number of executions for the 50 states and the District of Columbia were received from 
BJS as part of the Capital Punishment Series.399 Data for number of executions in each state was 
included from 1980 to 2013 and lagged one year in the regression analysis. That is, the regression 
examines executions in one year and the crime rate the following year. 
The number of executions varies widely from the number of people sentenced to death in that year. In 
2013, there were over 3,000 people on death row and only 39 executions. That same year there were 77 
new death sentences. The 39 executions in 2013 were carried out in only nine states, and three-fourths 
of the executions occurred in only three states, Texas, Oklahoma, and Florida. 400 
Data on Enactment of Right-to-Carry Laws
Data for right-to-carry gun laws was included from 1980 to 2013 for each of the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia. It was included in what is referred to as a “dummy variable:” for each year the 
state had laws on the books, the variable was one; if there was no right-to-carry law in effect, it was 
zero. This information was gathered from a variety of sources. The authors reviewed categorization and 
analyses of concealed carry laws by the National Rifle Association and the Law Center to Prevent Gun 
Violence, and then assessed state legislative websites and investigated news articles about pending or 
passed legislation to determine whether states fell under restrictive or lenient categories.401 
Laws also vary in their permissiveness or severity by state. Right-to-carry laws can fall under two broad 
categories: “shall issue” and “may issue.” “Shall issue” laws are more lenient with the requirements 
for receiving a concealed carry permit. “May issue” laws are more restrictive; they require that the 
individual receiving the permit have a legitimate reason for needing it. Most states over the past few 
decades have shifted towards enacting lenient right-to-carry laws rather than restrictive ones.402 
To account for both these categories, this report constructs two variables: 
• The “any right-to-carry law” variable captures all states with laws that give any individuals the
right to carry, whether to a select few (i.e. restrictive laws or “may issue laws”) or to many people
(i.e. lenient laws or “shall issue laws”). It includes states that allow concealed carry permits for
at least some (thus possibly even more than just “some”) members of the population. In other
words, it is states that have a “shall issue” law, which allows permits for almost any gun owner,
and states that have a “may issue” law, which allows permits for only some. The states that have
no right-to-carry laws at all would take the value of zero in the construction of this variable.
• The “lenient right-to-carry law” variable includes only states with lenient laws that make it
especially easy to carry a gun. It includes only states that allow just about anyone to receive a
permit, i.e. the states with a “shall issue” law. Any state that had no right-to-carry law or had a
“may issue” law would take the value of zero in this variable.
These variables attempt to describe some of the variation in how different right-to-carry laws can affect 
crime although certainly cannot account for all caveats of individual laws. The analysis in this report 
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cannot account for individual variations in each state. The authors ran both variables through the 
regression and achieved essentially the same results.
Data on Alcohol Consumption
Data on alcohol consumption were collected from the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism at the National Institutes of Health.403 
This report used beer consumption to measure the effect of alcohol consumption on crime. 
The amount of beer sold was chosen as the data source for alcohol consumption for several reasons. 
It is the most common form of alcohol consumption and generally tracks trends in overall alcohol 
consumption. It is also a common method through which social scientists examine this variable; using 
the same measure allows for comparison of results. Scholars have also found connections between beer 
consumption in particular and crime.404 Furthermore, trends in total alcohol consumption did not vary 
greatly from trends in beer consumption only.
Beer consumption was measured in gallons of ethanol consumed annually per capita, for each of the 50 
states and the District of Columbia, from 1980 to 2012. The number of gallons of ethanol in the form 
of beer sold in each state was reported from the states by the Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System at 
the National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism and from the beverage industry.405 Per capita 
alcohol consumption in gallons of ethanol for each state was then calculated using U.S. Census data 
and intercensal estimates (for years between censuses) for the population ages 14 and up. The effect of 
alcohol consumption is calculated holding fixed the other control variables in the regression, including 
age, so each variable’s effect on crime is isolated.
Data for 2013 were not available at the time of publication. Given the relative stability of beer 
consumption over the past several years, the authors used 2012 data a proxy for 2013 data. The authors 
projected alcohol data for 2013 in order to run their regression on the 2013 data for all other variables. 
This decision was vetted by empirical experts. Given the relative stability of alcohol consumption, it is 
unlikely this estimation affected this report’s findings. 
Data on Aging Population 
Data regarding age distribution were collected from the U.S. Census. These data can be accessed 
through the U.S. Census Bureau for 1980 to 1990 and from the Missouri Census Data Center from 
1991-2013.406 The U.S. Census Bureau collects population data every ten years. Additionally, it uses 
statistically methods to estimate populations in non-census years.  
To include the effect of age distribution, age was included as three control variables, each representing 
the percent of the resident population that was between the ages of 15 to 19, 20 to 24, and 25 to 30. 
Data for percent of the resident population in each age group in each of the 50 states and the District 
of Columbia was included from 1980 to 2013 in the regression analysis. 
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Data on Income 
Nominal per capita income data were collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and accessed 
via the Federal Reserve Economic Data.407 Data included in the regression analysis for income was 
the median annual income per capita, for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, from 
1980 to 2013.
Data on Unemployment
State unemployment rates were collected from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and accessed via the Federal 
Reserve Economic Data.408 Data for the percent of the residential population that was unemployed and 
looking for work, in each year, 1980 to 2013, for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, 
were included in the regression analysis. 
Unemployment is defined as individuals who currently do not have a job but are actively seeking one. 
This means that it does not include individuals without jobs, but that are not looking for one. Therefore, 
the actual number of individuals without jobs is higher than the unemployment rate suggests. 
Data on Race
Data on race were collected from the U.S. Census Bureau.409 The control variable included in the 
regression analysis was the percent of the residential population that identified as black, in each year, 
for each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, from 1980 to 2013.
Attempt to Secure Data for Other Variables
Data for the following variables was not available on an annual basis for all states from 1980 to 2013 
and therefore could not be run through the state-level multivariable regression. The authors therefore 
relied on the body of past research to provide a summary of the effect of each variable on crime.
• Inflation. The authors could not secure state-by-state data for any years for inflation from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Data for inflation is generally calculated as the percentage
change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), as collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The
data are available annually at a national level for the period studied but not at an individual
state level. The data are grouped into regions (northeast, south, west, and midwest) but still
cannot be run through a state-by-state level regression.410
• Consumer Confidence. The authors could not secure state-by-state data for any years for
consumer confidence. Consumer confidence is a measure conducted from surveys of individuals 
about how they feel about the state of the American economy. A higher number signals
more confidence. In contrast to other economic variables, it measures the psychological and
sociological perceptions of the health of the economy — which could be a greater predictor of
how the economy affects individual propensity to commit crimes than the actual health of the
economy. The Consumer Sentiment Index is collected by Thomson Reuters and the University
of Michigan. Like inflation, data on consumer confidence are available annually but not at the
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state-level, and is available for the same four regions of the U.S.411 It therefore could not be 
included in the authors’ state-level regression. 
•	 Waning Crack Use. The authors could not secure state-by-state data for any years for crack 
cocaine use. The National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) conducts an annual 
survey which collects data starting in 1990. Data from 1979, 1982, 1985, 1998, and 1990 
to 2001 is available from the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse (NHSDA), and 
data from 2002 to 2012 is available from NSDUH directly. . Because crack cocaine only 
became prevalent in the mid-1980s, data did not start to be collected until crack use was well 
underway.412 Due to the lack of state-by-state data and the missing years, this variable could 
not be included in the authors’ regression. 
•	 Decrease of Lead in Gasoline. The authors could not secure state-by-state data for any years for 
lead in gasoline. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency collects this data on a national level. 
Jessica Reyes used an original dataset to conduct her study, and the authors could not recover this 
data from her. Data on lead in the air are available as a national average back to 1980 but not at 
the state-level.413 This variable therefore could not be included in the authors’ regression. 
•	 Legalization of Abortion. The authors could not secure state-by-state data for seventeen years 
for legal incidents of abortion. The Guttmacher Institute collects data on the number and rate 
of abortions by state and has data since 1978. However, due to the costly nature of collecting 
the data, surveys of the number of abortions are done sporadically and are not available for every 
year from 1980 to 2013.414 Specifically, data is missing for 1983, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1993, 1994, 
1995, 1997, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2010, and 2011, for abortion. Because so 
many years of data were missing, the authors could not include this variable in their regression.
Data Not Included
It is impossible to include all possible theoretical contributors to the crime decline as the potential 
variables could be infinite. The authors chose 13 theories that were commonly cited in existing research 
and media reports to run in the state-level panel. Some factors such as technology, sentence lengths, 
other forms of policing, other criminal justice policies, or other social factors could also have contributed 
to the crime decline. Notably, technological advances in surveillance likely affected rates of burglary, 
robbery, and motor vehicle theft.415 
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B. This Report’s State-Level Regression Model 
The original empirical results presented in this report were found using regression analyses. Regressions 
are a set of mathematical tools for estimating the relationships between or among variables. In this case, 
the authors are interested in the relationship between crime and the variables thought to affect crime.
To begin a regression analysis, the authors specify a regression model, or a hypothesized relationship among 
the variables of interest. In this case, the model hypothesizes that crime is a function of incarceration, 
unemployment, capital punishment, and so on. Mathematically, a very simple relationship of that kind 
looks like the following equation:
Eq. 1  CRIME=a×INCARCERATION+b×UNEMPLOYMENT+
 c×CAPITAL PUNISHMENT+...+error
The numbers of interest are a, b, c, etc. These numbers represent how a change in one variable is 
associated with a change in crime. The dataset includes data from 1980 to 2013 for the variables 
CRIME, INCARCERATION, UNEMPLOYMENT, etc., and the mathematical methods of regression 
allow us to estimate the numbers a, b, c, and so on. Number a, the coefficient for incarceration, is an 
estimate for how a change in incarceration would be associated with change in crime, accounting for 
other variables. The same is true for number b, the coefficient for unemployment, and so on. There 
is also always an error term included in the model, as there will always be some variation in data that 
cannot be accounted for. However, with a correctly specified relationship, the regression will produce 
the best estimate for each variable’s effect on crime.
The authors primarily aimed to isolate the effect of incarceration on crime. They therefore included 
additional control variables in their regression to account for and isolate other factors that could have 
affected crime. For this reason, they used a multi-variable regression.
Incarceration Elasticity 
Elasticity is the percent change in one variable divided by the percent change in another. The authors 
calculated the changes in incarceration and crime in each decade. Using each study’s finding for 
incarceration’s effect on crime (the elasticity estimate), the authors estimated the percent of the crime 
decline attributable to the increase in incarceration in each decade. The authors found the percent change 
in incarceration and multiplied it by the elasticity estimate to get the estimate for the percent change in 
crime. Then the authors divided the estimated percent change in crime by the real change in crime to get 
the percent of the crime decline attributable to incarceration. The authors start with the elasticity estimate 
from the regression analysis and end with the percent of the change in crime attributable to the change 
in incarceration over a certain period of time. The percent attributable to incarceration changes can be 
calculated at the national level, for the effect of total state imprisonment, or for the effect in a specific state, 
using state imprisonment data specific to that state. The process is as follows:
Eq. 2 Estimated ELASTICITY ×% Δ INCARCERATION=Estimated % Δ CRIME
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Eq. 3 
Estimated % Δ CRIME
Real % Δ CRIME
=% of Δ CRIME attributable to Δ INCARCERATION
The data for crime and incarceration are included in the regressions as the logarithm of their per capita 
values. This serves to both mitigate the effect of any outlying observations, and to allow the estimates 
to be interpreted as elasticities. Including the logarithmic values allows the estimated number a to 
be interpreted as an elasticity. Including the variables in per capita form allows the authors to ignore 
issues that might arise from changes in population. The model also controls for potential unobserved 
differences between states, and between years (fixed effects). Furthermore, the data for incarceration 
are included one year “lagged.” In other words, the authors regressed the crime rate in 2012 on the 
incarceration rate in 2011, and so on. This is for two main reasons. First, it is because the incarceration 
data are provided as the yearend jurisdictional population. And second, it may mitigate, to some degree, 
any simultaneity between crime and incarceration.
Simultaneity is a potentially important consideration. A simultaneity effect occurs when changes in 
variable X cause changes in variable Y and changes in variable Y cause changes in variable X. That 
could conceivably be the case for incarceration and crime. Incarceration could decrease crime through 
deterrence, incapacitation or rehabilitation. Through what sociologists refer to as the criminogenic 
“feedback effect” of prison, incarceration could also increase crime. Changes in crime could also be 
seen to cause changes in incarceration; if there are more offenders, there will be more people arrested 
and more people imprisoned. This simultaneity problem can create challenges in a regression analysis. 
The effect of incarceration on crime captured by the elasticity estimate necessarily includes both effects, 
that of incarceration on crime and that of crime on incarceration. For this reason, it can be hard to 
tell by exactly how much increased imprisonment could be affecting crime. If the effect of crime on 
incarceration is zero — i.e. no simultaneity — the estimate represents one effect, that of incarceration on 
crime. There is evidence in the existing research that suggests that the simultaneity is not a major issue 
for the two main variables of interest.416 In the absence of simultaneity, the results can be interpreted as 
causal, meaning that elasticity estimate reflects only the effect of incarceration on crime, not vice versa. 
Therefore, the authors conclude that the regression estimate can be interpreted largely as a causal effect 
of incarceration on crime.
There are other ways to address simultaneity. One is through a controlled experiment. However, 
with something like incarceration, this is not feasible. Another is through natural experiments or 
instrumental variable techniques. A good instrumental variable is correlated with the explanatory 
variables, but not with the error term. However, good instruments are difficult to construct, and even 
then the results can be highly dependent on the instrument chosen. For instance, Levitt’s 1996 paper 
uses prison overcrowding legislation as an instrument (it is plausibly correlated with prison populations 
and plausibly uncorrelated with crime) and finds a large downward effect of incarceration on crime.417 
But Geert Dhondt’s 2012 study uses cocaine and marijuana mandatory minimum sentencing as an 
instrument and actually finds an upward effect of increased incarceration on crime.418 The authors 
recognize the potential issue of simultaneity but due to the complications invoked by instrumental 
variables did not apply that technique to their analysis. 
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Accounting for Diminishing Returns
Liedka and coauthors introduced an innovation to the simple linear analysis model to complicate the 
relationship between incarceration and crime.419 The authors built on Liedka and coauthors’ model 
using the description in the text of their study, tweaking the model to include an analysis and discussion 
of a series of other crime-affecting variables, specifically police numbers, use of death penalty, enactment 
of right to carry laws, and alcohol consumption. The authors also updated the analysis with thirteen 
years of more recent data in this report. The simple linear model illustrated in Equation 1 allows us 
to estimate only one, constant relationship between incarceration and crime. However, for the reasons 
outlined in Part I, this report found, as others argue, that the relationship between incarceration and 
crime has changed dramatically as the level of incarceration increased so greatly. A simple way to 
incorporate this possibility is to add another incarceration term to the model, such as the following:
Eq. 4 CRIME=a1×INCARCERATION+a2×INCARCERATION
2+
  b×UNEMPLOYMENT+c×CAPITAL PUNISHMENT+...+error
By adding a term for incarceration-squared, the model allows the relationship between crime and 
incarceration to vary with the level of incarceration. The analysis estimates the numbers and , the latter 
of which will be a function of the level of incarceration. The authors also ran regressions with a variety 
of other specifications, with various different incarceration terms, and in each case the findings are very 
similar: the returns to incarceration in the form of reduced crime decrease significantly in the level of 
incarceration. This is the important departure from most models in existing research. For simplicity 
and consistency, the results in this report are from a quadratic model like the one above. There are other 
ways to incorporate nonlinearity, including nonparametric and spline regressions. These models can 
also uncover incarceration’s diminishing returns.
Also included in the regression are “fixed effects.” Essentially, fixed effects are variables indicating that 
the data are from some given state and from some given year. Fixed effects incorporate differences by 
state and year, such as variations in percent urban population and other variables. They are commonly 
included in panel data studies such as these to account for unobserved differences between states 
and years. Following the work of Liedka et al. and others, this report uses a first-order autoregressive 
(AR(1)) error structure. Significance and confidence intervals reported are calculated according to 
robust standard errors. These technical features of the model improve the accuracy of the estimates, and 
allow the authors to correctly state in which results they are confident, statistically speaking.
Once the analysis produces estimates of the relationships between the various variables and crime, the 
authors then go back to the actual data, and estimate how actual changes in incarceration, say, affected 
crime. This is how the percentages of the crime decline attributed to the various factors are calculated.
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II. CITY-LEVEL ANALYSIS
The authors also ran a separate city-level regression analysis presented in Part II, using a city-level panel 
dataset and examining variables in the 50 most populous U.S. cities. 
Policing is typically implemented at the local police department level rather than statewide. Using state-
level data for an analysis may swamp any interesting variation observed at the city level. The analysis for 
this section is quite similar to the above, with some important differences.
A. Data Sources
The city-level dataset contains over 13,000 monthly observations over 23 years (from 1990 to 2012). 
In total the dataset contains over 198,000 entries. Having datasets this large allows the authors to 
obtain precise estimates of the effects of variables on crime. In addition, this dataset exhibits substantial 
variation, both over time and across states, in the implementation of CompStat and crime, allowing the 
authors to better identify and isolate the relationship between the two. 
The city-panel regression on crime included the following variables: CompStat (as a dummy variable 
(see explanation below)); lagged log of sworn police officers per capita; and city, month, and year fixed 
effects. The authors chose to examine the 50 most populous cities, which they identified through 2012 
census estimates.420
Data on Crime
The regression used FBI Uniform Crime Reports data for monthly reported crimes in each city from 
1990 to 2012. The authors collected this data from the UCR’s Crime Statistics Management Group.421 
City-level monthly data for 2013 was not available at time of publication. As explained above, despite 
its shortcomings the UCR is the most widely used national statistical tool on crime. 
Data on CompStat
As explained in Part II, the authors chose to use the CompStat program as an empirical case study of 
the effectiveness of one type of policing tool. 
The authors determined whether and when a city had CompStat through a wide variety of sources 
including police department information, city websites, and newspaper articles. This information was 
then confirmed by two methods. Phone calls were placed to each police department to confirm the 
information. National law enforcement experts then reviewed the data for accuracy. 
A “dummy variable” was constructed to indicate the implementation of CompStat. The variable takes 
the value 0 for all months before a city implements CompStat and then takes the value 1 in the month 
CompStat began and for all months after. If a city does not have a CompStat program at all, the value 
is 0 for all months from 1990 to 2012. 
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Of the 50 most populous cities, 42 cities were included in the regression. 39 cities implemented 
CompStat. 3 cities did not implement CompStat. (Notably, two cities — Seattle, Wash. and Detroit, 
Mich. — introduced CompStat after 2012 and are therefore included as not using CompStat during 
the regression period as it only runs through 2012.) 
Eight cities were not included because certain elements needed to be included in a monthly regression 
from 1980 to 2012 were absent. In five cities, (El Paso, Tex., Sacramento, Calif., San Jose, Calif., 
Jacksonville, Fl., and Miami, Fl.), CompStat was implemented but the authors were unable to identify 
an exact month of implementation. In two cities (Indianapolis, Ind. and Albuquerque, N.M.), police 
departments implemented and then terminated a CompStat program within a few years, and the 
termination month was unknown. In one city (Long Beach, Calif.) there was conflicting evidence as to 
whether a CompStat program was in place. After multiple calls to police departments, the authors were 
unable to verify necessary information in these cities.
Data on Numbers of Police
The number of sworn police officers for each city was also included in the regression. The count of 
officers is annual as of October 31st each year and is available through the UCR’s “Crime in the United 
States” publication for the years 1990 to 2012.422 However, since the data are collected annually as 
October 31st to October 31st, data for January to October 1990 is the number of officers as of October 
31, 1989. For years prior to 1995, the Crime in the United States publication is not available online 
and the authors collected this data via email from the UCR’s Crime Statistics Management Group.423 
Number of police officers is included in the regression to control for their effects as opposed to the 
effect of CompStat. 
B. This Report’s City-Level Regression 
Similar to before, the regression model for the city-level analysis is as follows:
CRIME=a×COMPSTAT+b×POLICE_NUMBERS+error
This is a type of interrupted time series approach.424 Also, like in the state-level analysis, the authors 
include month, year, and city fixed effects in the regression, to control for unobserved differences over 
time and between cities. Crime and police numbers are included in their logged per capita forms. 
Observations are weighted by the city’s average population over the time period.
The authors then use panel data regression techniques very similar to the state-level analysis to determine 
whether or not the introduction of a CompStat program affected future crime. An AR(1) error structure 
is not used here, as it is above. 
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C. Tables of Economic Findings
The results tables below present the results of the regression analyses discussed above and throughout 
this report. The results of the regression of incarceration and 12 other variables on crime are included 
in Tables 7 and 8. The results of the regression of CompStat on crime are included in Table 9.
Table 7: Regressions on ln(Crime)
(1)
“M&M”
(2)
Baseline
(3)
Quadratic
ln(Incarceration) -0.053
(0.031)
-0.049
(0.033)
-0.235
(0.159)
ln(Incarceration)^2 0.017
(0.014)
Police 0.012
(0.018)
0.012
(0.018)
Executions 4.7e-8
(3.7e-7)
1.2e-8
(3.7e-7)
Unemployment 0.002
(0.003)
0.002
(0.002)
Income -1e-5
(3.4e-6)
1e-5
(3.4e-6)
Beer consumption 0.096
(0.026)
0.097
(0.031)
Right-to-carry 0.004
(0.010)
0.004
(0.010)
% black -1.052
(0.540)
-0.983
(0.541)
% age 15-19 1.5e-5
(0.099)
7.5e-6
(9.7e-6)
8.5e-6
(1e-5)
% age 20-24 2.3e-5
(1e-5)
2.4e-5
(1e-5)
2.3e-5
(1e-5)
% age 25-29 1.8e-5
(4.8e-6)
2e-5
(4.9e-6)
1.9e-5
(4.7e-6)
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses
State and year fixed effects included in all columns
Column 1 recreates a similar analysis to Marvell and Moody, including some controls for the age 
distribution. Column 2, the “baseline model,” includes a wider set of controls. And column 3 includes 
those controls plus the quadratic incarceration term.
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Table 8: Elasticity estimates for various crime types
(1)
P.C.
(2)
Burg.
(3)
Larc.
(4)
M.V.T.
(5)
V.C.
(6)
A.A.
(7)
Rape
(8)
Hom.
(9)
Rob.
ln(Inc) -0.275
(0.167)
-0.234
(0.257)
-0.200
(0.153)
-0.893
(0.282)
0.186
(0.288)
-0.214
(0.394)
1.825
(0.310)
0.151
(0.473)
0.100
(0.283)
ln(Inc)^2 0.020
(0.015)
0.014
(0.022)
0.015
(0.013)
0.069
(0.026)
-0.017
(0.025)
0.024
(0.033)
-0.160
(0.028)
-0.010
(0.046)
-0.018
(0.024)
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses
State and year fixed effects included in all columns
The columns are regressions of the log of, in order, property crime, burglary, larceny/theft, motor 
vehicle theft, violent crime, aggravated assault, forcible rape, homicide, and robbery, of the log of 
incarceration and the log of incarceration squared. Each regression also includes fixed effects and the 
controls from the baseline model above, but they are omitted from the table for brevity.
Table 9: Regressions of CompStat on ln(Crime)
(1)
Total Crime
(1)
V.C.
(2)
P.C.
(3)
Homicide
CompStat -0.111**
(0.046)
-0.127
(0.080)
-0.112***
(0.040)
-0.128*
(0.066)
ln(Police) -0.453
(0.289)
-0.297
(0.324)
-0.487*
(0.286)
-0.437
(0.405)
Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses
City, month, and year fixed effects included in all columns
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
The columns are regressions of the log of, in order, total crime, violent crime, property crime, and 
homicide, on CompStat and the log of police. Each regression also includes fixed effects but they are 
omitted from the table for brevity.
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(confirmed TOP in use and implementation in May 2002). See Tucson Police Dep’t Ann. Rep. 40 (2011), available 
at http://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/police/2011_tpd_annual_report.pdf.
346 E-mail from Michael Hoskins, Major, Oklahoma City Police Department, to Veronica Clark (Nov. 14, 2013, 11:54 
EST) (confirmed a CompStat program called Comstat in use and implemented in July 2002). See City of Oklahoma 
City Fiscal Year 2003–2004 Proposed Budget D-126 (2003), available at http://bit.ly/1wqtNyL. Specifically, the 
program began in July 2002, according to Major Michael Hoskins at the Oklahoma City Police Department. 
347 Atlanta implemented a CompStat program called Command Operations Briefing to Revitalize Atlanta (COBRA), 
in July 2002. See Atlanta Police Found., Four Years Later: A Status Review of the Atlanta Police De-
partment’s Implementation of the Linder Plan of Action 21 (2008), available at http://bit.ly/1yNYsKH; see 
also Press Release, City of Atlanta, Chief Turner Joins Mayor Cities Chiefs Association In Honoring Former Atlanta 
Police Chief Richard Pennington (Jan. 14, 2013), available at http://www.atlantaga.gov/index.aspx?page=672&recor-
did=1603. 
348 E-mail from Sergeant Craig Buzbee, Fort Worth Police Department, to Veronica Clark (Apr. 15, 2014, 4:34 EST) 
(confirmed CompStat in use and implemented in 2002). See Program Profile: CompStat (Forth Worth, Texas), Crime 
Solutions, Nat’l Inst. Justice, http://www.crimesolutions.gov/ProgramDetails.aspx?ID=87.
349 E-mail from Commander Andrew Smith at the Los Angeles Police Department to Veronica Clark (confirmed Com-
pStat in use, implemented in 1998, and updated to more closely resemble traditional a CompStat program, like New 
York’s, by William Bratton in October 2002). See Walt Schick, CompStat in the Los Angeles Police Department, Police 
Chief, January 2004, http://bit.ly/1y3M3OH.
350 Omaha implemented CompStat in July 2003. See Tristan Bonn, Public Safety Auditor’s Report 21 (2003), 
available at http://omahapoliceauditor.files.wordpress.com/2012/06/psa-2003-3q-report-final.pdf.
351 Tel. Interview with Ellen Washburn, Sergeant, San Jose Police Department, (July 2, 2014) and Lieutenant Anthony 
Mata, San Jose Police Department, (July 8, 2014) (confirmed no CompStat and implemented IMPACT in the 2004, 
which was revamped into RCITI (pronounced “Our City”) in 2013). See Resume, Robert Davis 27 (2011), available at 
http://www.azcentral.com/ic/community/pdf/Redacted.Davis.pdf; see also Memorandum from Robert L. Davis, Chief of 
Police, City of San Jose to Hon. Mayor & City Council 4 (Sept. 11, 2007), available at http://bit.ly/1CGpV11. 
352 Nashville implemented CompStat on March 5, 2004. See Nashville Police Dep’t Ann. Rep. 4, 12 (2004), available 
at http://bit.ly/1GCvVyg. 
353 E-mail from Steve Beedle, Crime Analyst, Portland Police Bureau to Veronica Clark (Apr. 11, 2014, 19:00 EST) (con-
firmed a CompStat program called Comstat in use and implemented in March 2004). See Portland Police Bureau, 
Renewing Our Community Policing Vision 2 (2004), available at http://bit.ly/1uyWPSx. 
354 E-mail from Dennis Hebert, Captain, City of Virginia Beach Police, to Veronica Clark (Oct. 24, 2013, 10:44 EST) 
(confirmed CompStat in use and implemented in July 2004). See Police Chief Jim A. Cervera, City of Virginia 
Beach, http://www.vbgov.com/government/departments/city-manager/form-of-government/pages/police.aspx. 
355 Dallas implemented CompStat in September 2004. See Dallas Police Dep’t, Dallas Police Department Manage-
ment and Efficiency Study, Update and Progress 19 (2005), available at http://bit.ly/1y3MIzU. 
356 Kansas City, Mo. implemented a CompStat program called Comprehensive Strategic Team Accountability Review 
(CSTAR), in March 2005. See Jonas H. Baughman & Joel M. Caplan, Rutgers Ctr. on Public Security RTM 
Insights 3 n.4 (2010), available at http://www.rutgerscps.org/docs/KCPD_RTMinAction_Brief.pdf; see also Dep’t 
Memorandum No. 05–28, Kansas City Police Dep’t, CSTAR (Comprehensive Strategic Team Accountability Review) 
(Dec. 1, 2005), available at http://bit.ly/1JnoTts. 
357 Tel. Interview by Veronica Clark with Cleveland Police Department representative (Oct. 16, 2013) (confirmed a 
CompStat program called CrimeView in use and implemented in October 2005). See Press Release, The Omega 
Group, City of Cleveland Implements CrimeView (Oct. 14, 2005), available at http://bit.ly/186hbrZ. 
358 Columbus implemented a CompStat program, modeled after Baltimore’s CitiStat program in January 2006. 
See Columbus, Ohio Organizational Snapshot: Columbus*Stat, Gov’t Finance Officers Assoc., available at 
http://bit.ly/1BM4DT3. 
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359 Denver adapted their Command Operation Review and Evaluation (Core) program to resemble the CompStat 
structure in February 2006. See Alec Magnet, Denver Tackles Crime, New York Style, City J., 2007, available at 
http://bit.ly/1yJZ7Oz. 
360 Fresno implemented a CompStat program called Crime View in May 2006. See Crime View Maps and Reports, Fresno 
Police Department, City of Fresno, http://bit.ly/1CV0JEE; see also Fresno Police Dep’t Ann. Rep. 14 (2006), 
available at http://bit.ly/186hm6P. 
361 E-mail from Sergeant Anthony Landato, Mesa Police Department, to Veronica Clark (Apr. 14, 2014, 16:50 EST) 
(confirmed CompStat in use and implemented in August 2006). PARC Interview, Police Assessment Resource 
Center, March 2009, http://bit.ly/186hnHV.
362 Washington, DC implemented a CompStat program, called CapStat, now DC Stat, in January 2007. See Mitch Wander, 
Release the CapStat Results, Greater Greater Washington, Dec. 22, 2010, available at http://bit.ly/1BM593x; see also 
Revision to Crime Data Summary Information, Crime Incidents (ASAP), http://map.data.dc.gov/About_Crimes.html.
363 Tel. Interview by Veronica Clark with Boston Police Department representative (confirmed CompStat in use and 
implemented in February 2007). See Boston Police Dep’t Ann. Rep. 19 (2007), available at http://bit.ly/15CPTbZ. 
364 Austin implemented CompStat in March 2008. See Jason Dusterhoft, Highway Enforcement Command, Austin Po-
lice Department 9 (2011), available at http://bit.ly/15vQD1J; see also 2011 Traffic Safety Conference: Program, Texas 
A&M Transp. Inst., http://bit.ly/15vQFqy.
365 E-mail from Paul Paskoff, Director, Research & Planning Division, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, to 
Julia Bowling and Lauren-Brooke Eisen (Apr. 3, 2014, 10:58 EST) (confirmed CompStat in use and implemented in 
April 2008). See Charlotte Mecklenburg Police Dep’t Ann. Rep. 26 (2007), available at http://bit.ly/1CjkJCm.
366 Milwaukee implemented CompStat in July 2008. See Mike Nichols, Wis. Police Res. Inst., Why Milwaukee’s 
Police Are More Effective Than Their Teachers (2011), available at http://bit.ly/1GCzg0g. 
367 Oakland implemented CompStat in January 2009. See City of Oakland Agenda Rep. 1 (2009), available at http://
clerkwebsvr1.oaklandnet.com/attachments/21028.pdf. 
368 E-mail from Officer Leland Ashley, Tulsa Police Department, to Veronica Clark (Apr. 14, 2014, 10:07 EST) (confirmed 
CompStat in use and implemented in March 2009). See Margaret Stokes & Chris Howell, Tulsa Police Begin Comp-
Stat, News on 6 (Mar. 24, 2009, 4:45 PM), available at http://www.newson6.com/Global/story.asp?s=10063615&cli-
enttype=printable.
369 San Francisco implemented CompStat in October 2009. See Alex Emslie, CompStat vs. Community Policing, San 
Francisco Bay Guardian, June 22, 2010, available at http://bit.ly/15CQeeG.
370 E-mail from Molly Miles, Colorado Springs Police Department to Veronica Clark (Apr. 11, 2014, 7:59 EST) 
(confirmed CompStat program implemented in past and stopped in 2011). See Police Exec. Found., Police Leaders at 
PERF/BJA Meeting Discuss CompStat: Best Practices and Future Outlook, 25 Subject to Debate 7–8 (2011), available 
at http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Subject_to_Debate/Debate2011/debate_2011_marapr.pdf (CompStat imple-
mented in December 2010).
371 Tel. Interview with Chicago Police Department representative Timothy Jordan (Dec 17, 2014) (confirmed that before 
Garry McCarthy took over, the crime mapping and accountability program in place in Chicago was not called Com-
pStat and did not embody the system in New York and other cities. He confirmed that with McCarthy’s CompStat, 
Chicago police began looking at more granular data, in shorter intervals, at more regular meetings, as well as modi-
fying the organizational structure). Chicago implemented CompStat around July 2011. See Whet Moser, Meet Garry 
McCarthy, Chicago’s New Top Cop, Chicago Mag., May 2, 2011, available at http://chi.mg/1CjkV4p; see also Bureau 
of Justice Assistance & Police Exec. Research Forum, CompStat: Its Origins, Evolution, and Future in Law 
Enforcement Agencies 12 (2013), available at http://bit.ly/15gh0Z4.
372 San Antonio implemented a CompStat program called StrIDE in October 2011. See Jazmine Ulloa, SAPD Looks to 
Maintain E. Side Progress, My San Antonio, Oct. 19, 2011, available at http://bit.ly/15gpf7z; see also San Antonio 
24/7: Providing Services/Measuring Results, Fiscal Year 2012 3rd Quarter Results 6 (2012), available at 
http://bit.ly/1GCzGUv. 
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373 E-mail from Officer Jennifer Moreno, Detroit Police Department to Veronica Clark (Apr. 11, 2014, 15:54 EST) 
(confirming CompStat in use and implemented in July 2013). The Midtown neighborhood of the city established a 
CompStat program in 2009, but the full implementation of the program to the rest of the city was ongoing as of 2013. 
See CUS Urban Safety Program helps facilitate Midtown COMPSTAT, Wayne St. U. Ctr. for Urban Stud., Nov. 12, 
2009, available at http://bit.ly/1CV3MMU; see also City Of Detroit, Restructuring Plan: Mayor’s Implemen-
tation Progress Report 25 (2013), available at http://bit.ly/1Cm0Meu. 
374 Tel. Interview with Seattle Police Department representative (July 7, 2014) (confirmed SeaStat in use and implement-
ed in 2014). See Seattle Police Dep’t, SeaStat: What Is It? And How Are Police Using It to Disrupt Crime Trends?, Sept. 
17, 2014, available at http://bit.ly/1CjjrqT.
375 Jacksonville has a CompStat program, called Crime Reduction by Intervention & Management of Enforcement Strat-
egies (CRIMES), but the date of implementation is unknown. See John H. Rutherford, Jacksonville Journey 
Steering Committee Briefing 63 (2008), available at http://bit.ly/1uyXDXD. 
376 Tel. Interview with public information officers (confirmed CompStat in use, implementation date unknown). See 
CompStat Support, Miami Police Dep’t, http://www.miami-police.org/CompStat_support.html. 
377 Tel. Interview with Lieutenant Dan East, Public Information Officer, Wichita Police Department (July 7, 2014) (con-
firmed no CompStat ever used, and confirmed use of community policing beginning in the 1990s). See Stan Finger, 
Wichita Police Bureaus Add Analysts to Look for Crime Trends, Wichita Eagle, Feb. 19, 2012, available at http://bit.
ly/1BicXax. 
378 Tel. Interview with Keith Smith, Public Information Officer, Houston Police Department (July 7, 2014) (confirmed 
no CompStat ever used, and confirmed use of Real Time Crime Information Center beginning in 2008).
379 Phoenix does not have CompStat, but currently uses a Geographic Information System called ArcView to map crimes. A 
City Council Policy Agenda Report from 2013 mentions a plan to implement a CompStat program in the near future. 
The department confirmed that CompStat is very new in the department and is not yet fully implemented. See Crime 
Statistics and Maps, Phoenix Police Dep’t, http://phoenix.gov/police/crista1.html; see also Policy Agenda from David 
Cavazos, City Manager, Phoenix to Mario Paniagua, Budget & Research Director 107 (Feb. 12, 2013), available at 
http://phoenix.gov/webcms/groups/internet/@inter/@dept/@budget/documents/web_content/d_051145.pdf. 
380 There was conflicting evidence of CompStat usage in Long Beach. Long Beach was not included in the regression 
analysis due to the conflicting evidence. Compare Telephone Interview with Eric Cregeen, Sergeant and Public Infor-
mation Officer, Long Beach Police Department (July 3, 2014) (confirmed Long Beach never had a CompStat program 
in place), with Ed Brock, Cities Find New Uses for Crime Fighting Tool, Am. City & Cnty., Nov. 1, 2006, available at 
http://americancityandcounty.com/publicsafety/government_cities_find_new (LBPD Crime Analyst stated that Com-
pStat had been in use in Long Beach for three years).
381 See footnotes for 331-380; see also FBI, Uniform Crime Reports as prepared by the National Archive of Crim-
inal Justice Data, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov (providing monthly city-level crime statistics from 1960 to 2012).
382 Data for sworn police officers 1989-1994 were sent from the UCR Program’s Crime Statistics Management Group to 
Veronica Clark, on file with authors. Data for 1995-2012 are available online at the FBI’s UCR website. UCR Pub-
lications, Uniform Crime Reports, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, http://1.usa.gov/1q6CZ84 (The data are accessed 
through the Law Enforcement Personnel section or the Police Employee Data section and found in Table 78).
383 See UCR Data Online, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm (providing 
crime statistics from 1960 to 2013). For more information on how authors calculated date of CompStat implementa-
tion and numbers of police, see Appendix B.
384 See Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT)—Prisoners, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://1.usa.gov/1L3tTqA; 
UCR Data Online, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm. 
385 UCR Data Online, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm.
386 UCR Offense Definitions, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/offenses.cfm.
387 “See Data Quality Guidelines, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/data-quality-guidelines-new.
388 See Erica Goode, Rape Definition Too Narrow in Federal Statistics, Critics Say, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 2011, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/29/us/federal-rules-on-rape-statistics-criticized.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; UCR 
Program Changes Definition of Rape, FBI, http://1.usa.gov/1L3zPQu.
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389 See UCR Data Online, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/index.cfm.
390 See, e.g., David Bernstein & Noah Isackson, The Truth About Chicago’s Crime Rates, Chicago Mag., Apr. 7, 2014, 
www.chicagomag.com/Chicago-Magazine/May-2014/Chicago-crime-rates/.
391 For a more detailed description of NCVS and comparison of the NCVS and UCR, see The Nation’s Two Crime Mea-
sures, Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics, http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/twomeasures.cfm.
392 Corrections Statistical Analysis Tool (CSAT)—Prisoners, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://1.usa.gov/1L3tTqA.
393 See Lauren E. Glaze & Erinn J. Herberman, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations in the 
United States, 2012 2 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf. 
394 Tel. Interview with Tom Zelenock, Bureau of Justice Statistics Project Manager, National Archive of Criminal Justice 
Data, (May 30, 2014).
395 See Annual Survey of Jails, Bureau of Justice Statistics, www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=261; see also Census 
of Jails, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=254.
396 See, e.g., Lauren E. Glaze & Erinn J. Herberman, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Correctional Populations in 
the United States, 2012 2 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus12.pdf.
397 UCR Publications, Uniform Crime Reports, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, http://1.usa.gov/1q6CZ84; see also Justice 
Expenditures and Employment Data, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://1.usa.gov/1y3L8xN.
398 See Matthew J. Hickman & Brian A. Reaves, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Local Police Departments, 2003 2 
ex.1 (2006), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/lpd03.pdf.
399 See Executions, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=182.
400 See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Death Penalty in 2013: Year End Report (2014), available at http://bit.ly/1eqNrIb.
401 See Nat’l Rifle Assoc., Inst. for Legislative Action, State Laws, http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-laws.aspx; 
Law Ctr. to Prevent Gun Violence, Concealed Weapons Permitting Policy Summary, August 28, 2013, 
http://smartgunlaws.org/concealed-weapons-permitting-policy-summary. 
402 See Jim Cleary & Emily Shapiro, Minn. House of Representatives Research Dep’t, The Effects of “Shall 
Issue” Concealed-Carry Licensing Laws: A Literature Review 1 (1999), available at http://bit.ly/186fTx8.
403 See Robin A. LaVallee, et al., Nat’l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism & Nat’l Insts. of Health, Appar-
ent per Capita Alcohol Consumption: National, State, and Regional Trends, 1977-2010 (2014), available at 
pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/surveillance98/CONS12.pdf.
404 See Sara Markowitz, An Economic Analysis of Alcohol, Drugs, and Violent Crime in the National Crime Victimization 
Survey 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7982, 2000), available at http://bit.ly/1xEDoTX.
405 See Robin A. LaVallee, et al., Nat’l Inst. on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism & Nat’l Insts. of Health, Appar-
ent per Capita Alcohol Consumption: National, State, and Regional Trends, 1977-2010  (2014), available at 
pubs.niaaa.nih.gov/publications/surveillance98/CONS12.pdf.
406 See State Population Estimates and Demographic Components of Change: 1980 to 1990, by Single Year of Age and Sex, 
U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/popest/data/state/asrh/1980s/80s_st_age_sex.html; New Population Es-
timates with Demographic Detail Available, Mo. Census Data Ctr., http://mcdc.missouri.edu/ (providing data from 
1990 to 2013).
407 State Per Capita Personal Income, Econ. Research, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, http://bit.ly/1yT2uEA.
408 Regional and State Employment and Unemployment, Econ. Research, Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 
http://bit.ly/1Exa0Uz.
409 Population ranking of U.S. cities in 2012 is available at Population Estimates, U.S. Census, http://1.usa.gov/15vPyXW.
410 See Consumer Price Index, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.
411 See Announcements, Surveys of Consumers, Univ. Mich., http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/.
412 See Browse and Download Data, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Data Archive (SAMHDA), 
http://bit.ly/1unPCiC.
413 See National Trends in Lead Levels, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, http://www.epa.gov/airtrends/lead.html.
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414 Data Center, Guttmacher Inst., http://www.guttmacher.org/datacenter/index.jsp.
415 See, e.g., Philip Cook & Jens Ludwig, Economical Crime Control, in Controlling Crime: Strategies and Tradeoffs 
1, 4 (Philip J. Cook et al. eds., 2011) (finding that improved private precautions through technological advances likely 
played a role in the sharp decline in auto theft); Ian Ayers & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unob-
servable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q. J. Econ. 43 (1998) (finding that LoJack availability is 
associated with a sharp decline in motor vehicle theft, while rates of other crime do not experience significant change).
416 See generally Raymond V. Liedka et al., The Crime-Control Effect of Incarceration: Does Scale Matter?, 5 Crim. & Pub. 
Pol’y 245 (2006); see also Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, Prison Population Growth and Crime Reduction, 
10 J. Quantitative Criminology 109 (1994); Alfred Blumstein & Allen J. Beck, Population Growth in US Prisons, 
1980–1996, 26 Crime. & Just. 17, 54 (1999).
417 See Steven D. Levitt, The Effect of Prison Population Size on Crime Rates: Evidence from Prison Overcrowding Legislation, 
111 Quart. J. Econ. 2, 348 (1996), available at http://bit.ly/1y3JwnU.
418 See Geert L. Dhondt, The Relationship Between Mass Incarceration and Crime in the Neoliberal Period in the United 
States (Sept. 1, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts—Amherst) (on file with Univer-
sity of Massachusetts—Amherst), available at http://bit.ly/15CPgPt.
419 Raymond V. Liedka, et al., The Crime-Control Effect of Incarceration: Does Scale Matter?, 5 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 
245 (2006).
420 See Table 7: Resident Population by Sex and Age: 1980 to 2009, U.S. Census Bureau (2011), http://1.usa.gov/1CGntI0. 
421 CD-ROM from Uniform Crime Reports representative to Veronica Clark (Nov. 14, 2013).
422 See UCR Publications, Uniform Crime Reports, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, http://1.usa.gov/1q6CZ84.
423 E-mail from Crime Statistics Management Group representative, Uniform Crime Reports, to Veronica Clark (Nov. 
14, 2013).
424 For more on interrupted time series analysis, see Paul D Allison, Using Panel Data to Estimate the Effects of Events, 23 
Soc. Methods Res. 174 (1994), available at http://smr.sagepub.com/content/23/2/174.abstract.
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